American-educated Chinese Students and Their Impact on U.S.-China Relations by Litten, Joshua A.
W&M ScholarWorks 
Undergraduate Honors Theses Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects 
5-2009 
American-educated Chinese Students and Their Impact on U.S.-
China Relations 
Joshua A. Litten 
College of William and Mary 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses 
Recommended Citation 
Litten, Joshua A., "American-educated Chinese Students and Their Impact on U.S.-China Relations" 
(2009). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 256. 
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/honorstheses/256 
This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, & Master Projects at 
W&M ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized 
administrator of W&M ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@wm.edu. 
 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
AMERICAN-EDUCATED CHINESE STUDENTS AND  
THEIR IMPACT ON U.S.-CHINA RELATIONS 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts with Honors in 
History from the College of William and Mary in Virginia, 
 
by 
 
Joshua A. Litten 
 
 
 
             Accepted for __________________ 
 
 
              Craig Canning___ Director 
 
               
              Eric Han________ 
 
 
              T.J. Cheng_______ 
 
 Williamsburg, Virginia 
 May 2009 
 
 
 
 
 2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Introduction…………………………………………………………………………....................... 3 
 
Chapter 1: The Forerunners…………………………………………………………...................... 
Yung Wing and the Chinese Educational Mission, 1847 – 1900 
 
7 
 
Chapter 2: “Unofficial Envoys”…………………………………………………………………… 
The Boxer Indemnity Scholarships, 1900 – 1949 
 
29 
 
Chapter 3: The Lost Generation………………………………………………………………….... 
Taiwan and the Mainland, 1949 – 1979 
 
55 
 
Chapter 4: There and Back Again…………………………………………………………………. 
Post-Normalization, 1979 – Present 
 
68 
 
Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………… 
 
89 
 
Bibliographical Essay……………………………………………………………………………... 
 
91 
 
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………….. 
 
99 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 
Introduction 
 
The history of American-educated Chinese students has paralleled the development of 
Sino-American relations almost from its inception upon the arrival of the trader ship Empress 
of China in Canton in 1784. However, currently no single study covers the entire history of 
that educational exchange. This is especially discouraging because Chinese students and 
educational exchange policies have influenced U.S.-China relations for more than one 
hundred and fifty years. The number of Chinese students and their experiences in the United 
States often serve as an important historical indicator of the status of diplomatic relations 
between the two nations at any given time. Chinese students exerted considerable political 
strength within either American or Chinese political spheres during certain periods – the 
broad national Chinese Students’ Alliance (1902-1931) organized by the second generation 
of Chinese students and the student lobbyist movement that developed in the wake of the 
Tiananmen Square protests and crackdown in 1989 are both important examples. Even where 
political influence and leverage is not an issue, the perception of Chinese as hard-working 
intellectuals has pervaded the American public. The number of Chinese students in the 
United States has steadily grown over time, increasing public exposure to those students. 
The trend continues. Nearly 90,000 Chinese students and scholars studied in the 
United States during the 2006-2007 school year, a record high.1 When the Institute of 
International Education (IIE), a non-profit organization dedicated to the advancement of 
international exchange programs, launched a series of reports on global education in 2008, 
they began with a volume on U.S.-China educational exchange. The report also indicates that 
a greater number of American students are now studying in China, and several articles also 
                                                 
1
 Shepherd Laughlin, “Trends and Models of Academic Exchange Between China and the U.S.,” in U.S.-China 
Educational Exchange: Perspectives on a Growing Partnership, ed. Shepherd Laughlin (New York: AIFS 
Foundation and Institute of International Education: 2008), 4-5. 
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note a norm-defying shift in the focus of graduate research to China in recent years. In an 
article by reporter Ariana Eunjung Cha published on February 20, 2008, The Washington 
Post claimed that since the year 2000, over 275,000 scholars and scientists have returned to 
China to study and work.2 As major shifts in the educational exchange dynamic begin to 
surface, a grasp of the effects of educational exchange on U.S.-China relations historically 
can be very enlightening. 
This paper aims to construct a historical narrative tracing Chinese students in 
America over 160 years from Yung Wing – the first Chinese national to graduate from an 
American university (Yale, Class of 1854) – to the post-Tiananmen movement and current 
exchange trends and policies. Furthermore, this paper argues that Chinese students have 
heavily influenced Sino-American relations through active movements, passive perception 
creation, and policies upon returning home to China. The altering of racial and national 
perception in particular played an important part in the role of Chinese students in the United 
States. With only a few important exceptions, Chinese students were largely incapable of 
directly affecting diplomacy between the two nations while completing their studies. While 
their careers afterward certainly played a large role in defining U.S.-China relations and such 
careers are covered in this thesis, the importance of altering American perceptions of China 
and Chinese people as well as Chinese perceptions of America cannot be overemphasized. 
Because of the broad span of time covered, the paper is divided into four chapters, 
each focusing on one “generation” of Chinese students and scholars in the United States. 
Each chapter discusses the movements and trends of a particular “generation” within the 
context of Chinese and American history and U.S.-China relations. Case studies within each 
                                                 
2
 Ariana Eunjung Cha, “Opportunities in China Lure Scientists Home,” The Washington Post, February 20, 
2008. 
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chapter aim to highlight some of the larger contributions to Sino-American relations and 
changes in Chinese study in America. Since time rarely allows itself to be conveniently 
squashed into mere periods of history, there is considerable overlap of students, returned 
students, and diplomats from chapter to chapter, but such overlap, in my view, serves to 
strengthen the connections provided by a comprehensive history of American-educated 
Chinese students. 
Chapter One (1847-1900) provides background information about the first 
educational exchange movement within China, giving context to the first generation of 
visiting Chinese students. The main focus of the chapter is on Yung Wing and the students, 
policies and effects of the Chinese Educational Mission. Chapter Two (1900-1949) discusses 
the second generation of students, an extremely influential group whose origins can be traced 
back to the Boxer Indemnity Scholarships. These students formed the Chinese Students’ 
Alliance, an association grown out of grassroots movements on college campuses which 
provided both support and opportunities for a forum of Chinese students abroad. They were 
extremely well organized both abroad and at home. The chapter also encompasses the 
Chinese Civil War between communist forces and the ruling Guomindang party, the 
disastrous consequences of which effectively ended the period of the second generation of 
American-educated Chinese students. Chapter Three (1949-1979) effectively shifts focus 
from mainland China to Taiwan, tracing the rocky relationship with both the People’s 
Republic of China and the separate Nationalist government of the Republic of China on 
Taiwan during this time. The chapter’s title, “The Lost Generation,” refers to three separate 
groups. This includes students stranded in the United States, students caught up in 
devastating events in mainland China, and students in Taiwan who saw their importance 
 6 
decline as a result of American President Richard Nixon’s visit to China in February 1972 
and the warming relations between the People’s Republic and the United States following the 
Shanghai Communiqué drafted during that visit. Chapter Four (1979-2008) covers the 
explosive influx of Chinese students studying in the United States since normalization of 
relations in 1979. It also highlights the student lobbyist movement following the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre of June 1989 and ends with a report on present trends in U.S.-China 
educational exchange, including the recent rise in numbers of scholars returning to China for 
graduate study and work. However, while the thesis ends in 2009, when over 275,000 
Chinese exchange students are studying in the United States, it begins with one single 
pioneer in educational exchange, Yung Wing. 
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Chapter 1: The Forerunners  
Yung Wing and the Chinese Educational Mission, 1847-1900 
 
 At age nineteen, Yung Wing and two other Chinese students made history as the first 
Chinese to study in the United States. Chaperoned by their teacher from a Hong Kong 
missionary school, the three students made waves in white American society first in New 
York and later in Connecticut where they attended the Monson Academy. One student 
quickly returned to China, while another left for medical training in Scotland. By 1849, only 
Yung Wing remained in the United States. Yung Wing struggled through financial troubles 
and challenging classes, but he became the first Chinese student to graduate from an 
American university when he received a degree from Yale in 1854. However, the Chinese 
government at the time did not recognize Yung Wing’s achievement or attempt to follow in 
his footsteps for nearly twenty years. 
After all, the idea of Chinese studying in America did not originate with conservative 
Chinese bureaucrats. Yung Wing’s path to America began with the work of Dr. Robert 
Morrison, a British citizen and member of the London Missionary Society,3 and the first 
Protestant missionary to China in 1807. Morrison and the missionaries who followed him 
settled in and around Guangzhou during the early 1800s, traveling to the Middle Kingdom 
with the intent of Christianizing and educating the Chinese. Protestant missionaries overcame 
not only the obstacles posed by the local Chinese administrators but also the jealousy of the 
already established Catholic missionaries in Macao and western Guangdong. Dr. Morrison 
met these challenges and served as an example for the missionary community. His work in 
translation led to the first accurate Chinese translation of the Bible, spearheaded by Morrison 
                                                 
3
 The London Missionary Society was founded in 1795 in London as The Missionary Society with the intent to 
send Protestant evangelicals abroad. The society’s first missions, which were to Tahiti, were disastrous; a return 
ship was captured by French privateers. However, the society quickly recovered and subsequently sponsored 
Morrison’s mission to China. 
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with help from three other Protestant missionaries. This same translation was later used by 
the self-proclaimed Christian Taiping rebels.4 
 Morrison’s precedent-setting missionary school for Chinese people was not built and 
operated in China but in the British colony of Malacca in present-day Malaysia. After much 
persecution in China, Morrison managed to garner approval from the London Missionary 
Society to establish a seminary to train Malacca’s small Chinese population in Christian 
catechism. The pattern Morrison and his colleague, Mr. William Milne, established ensured 
that the children first “received the ordinary elements of Chinese education. By-and-by the 
Catechism prepared by Mr. Morrison was introduced, and the children were familiarized with 
the leading words of religious character….”5 This school became a model for the educational 
system Morrison spent his later years advocating in Guangzhou. For Morrison, as for most 
early missionaries, educating the Chinese meant teaching them English and Christian values 
with the purpose of making evangelicals out of local converts. 
 When Morrison died on August 1, 1834, the foreign missionary community in China 
felt a deep loss. On January 26, 1835, a notice was passed around the foreign community in 
Guangdong, recommending the formation of an association designed to “improve and 
promote English education in China by schools and other means” as a fitting memorial to 
Morrison and his mission.6 Set up with the Morrison-Milne model in mind, the school did not 
last long due to limited funding from an overstretched missionary community, but it did 
                                                 
4
 W.J. Townsend, Robert Morrison: The Pioneer of Chinese Missions (London: S.W. Partridge & Co., 1888), 
41, 102. The Taiping Rebels were rebellious forces mostly from Southern China influenced by Christian ideas 
and led by Hong Xiuquan, a failed scholar who manipulated anti-Manchu sentiment in the 1850s and 
proclaimed himself to be the brother of Jesus. Paradoxically, the society borrowed ideas from Puritanism while 
leaders indulged in polygamy and fought for power – leading to the downfall in 1864 of the Kingdom of 
Heavenly Peace they had erected in Nanjing. 
 
5
 Townsend, 84-85. 
 
6
 Yung, 14. 
 9 
eventually launch the career of the first Chinese student ever to graduate from an American 
university: Yung Wing. 
 Yung Wing was born the third of four children on November 17, 1828 in Nam Ping, a 
village just southwest of Macao on Pedro Island.7 His parents were farmers, but their 
proximity to the foreign trade teeming in Macao, occupied by the Portuguese since traders set 
up a settlement in 1557, numbed them to the shock and vexation foreigners often caused 
other Chinese. In 1835, Mrs. Mary Gützlaff, spouse of the Lutheran missionary Reverend 
Charles (Karl) Gützlaff, formed a local missionary school.8 Originally a girl’s school, it soon 
accepted a limited number of boys as well, pending the opening of the Morrison School in 
1839. Yung Wing’s parents heard about the school through a family connection employed by 
the Gützlaff school. Though Yung Wing himself questioned his parents’ decision to enroll 
him in the school, their reasoning appears to have been very progressive. With his eldest 
brother already on the institutionalized Confucian path to the professional bureaucracy, Yung 
Wing was of more use to his family’s guanxi, a Chinese term roughly meaning relations 
network (through personal contacts), by studying English and creating connections with the 
burgeoning foreign community. 
 Mrs. Gützlaff – as Yung Wing always referred to her in his memoirs – was English, 
unlike her German husband, and at age seven perhaps the first white woman Yung Wing had 
ever met. The missionary’s wife separated Yung Wing from the other boys and trained him 
alongside her female students and two nieces. Yung Wing’s grooming was almost for naught 
when, in 1840, his father unexpectedly died. Both Yung Wing and his elder brother were 
                                                 
7
 Yung, 1. 
 
8
 Old Foh-kien, Obituary Rev. Charles Gutzlaff. D.D. from the Gentleman’s Magazine, Sylvanus Urban, 1851, 
http://www.fohkien.cn/gtutzlaff_obit_.htm. Accessed on December 3, 2008. 
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recalled from their studies in order to support the family through odd jobs such as fishing, 
harvesting, and apprentice printing. It was completely by chance that Dr. Benjamin Hobson, 
a medical missionary and friend of the Gützlaff family, found Yung Wing at the printer’s 
shop less than a mile from the doctor’s makeshift hospital.9 
 Hobson had promised Mary Gützlaff that he would enroll Yung Wing in the Morrison 
School once it was properly established. Founded on November 1, 1839, the school was 
placed under the care of an American missionary and graduate of Yale College, Reverend 
Samuel Robbins Brown.10 Yung Wing was enrolled by 1841; he spent five years with young 
men slightly his elder but his peers in educational progress. His love was so great for the 
school which prepared him for America that years later he named one of his two sons after 
the institution and its namesake. Though Brown’s class originally consisted of five young 
men, the size grew to the point where another teacher was required. On March 12, 1845, the 
school hired missionary William Allen Macy as an assistant teacher. Also a Yale graduate, 
Macy confirmed the wide-reaching influence of Yale College upon his Chinese students. In 
1846, the ultimate goal of the Morrison School and Reverend Brown was revealed: Brown 
wished to bring a few of his oldest and most talented students back with him to America. His 
health had taken a turn for the worse and with his own return imminent, he had made 
arrangements for sponsors to cover the travel cost of students leaving with him. When he 
made this startling offer to his students four months before his departure, only three students 
stood to accept. The first on his feet was Yung Wing.11 
                                                 
9
 Yung, 7-13. 
 
10
 LaFargue, 19. 
 
11
 Yung, 13-19. 
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 Yung Wing was joined by two other Morrison school students, Wong Foon and 
Wong Hsing, in securing free passage on the Olyphant Brothers’12 ship, the Huntress. 
Together with Reverend Brown, they left the harbor at Whampoa on January 4, 1847, and 
arrived in New York on April 12. Brown brought the young men around to see various 
members of the missionary community; they caused quite a stir one morning when the three 
of them sat together in Reverend Shubael Bartlett’s church in New Haven.13 For many in the 
area, they were the first Chinese that white Americans in New Haven had ever met. 
 Special interest was shown in the three Chinese boys wherever they went; they were 
seen as hope for further Christianizing the Chinese by example. Reverend Charles 
Hammond, principal of the Monson Academy and another Yale graduate, lavished attention 
on them for “the possible good that might come out of their education.”14 Most of their time 
at Monson Academy, a preparatory school for Yale, was spent in the English department, but 
their studies also included Physiology, Philosophy and Math. In the meantime, Yung Wing 
formed a bond with the local community, setting up the network he would call on in years to 
come. 
 At the outset, the plan for the boys’ education ended in 1849. Wong Hsing, the oldest 
boy, returned to China in the fall of 1848 for health reasons. After his departure, Wong Foon 
and Yung Wing agreed to stay in the United States after 1849 and continue their studies. 
However, their original funds dried up by the end of the 1849 school year. Andrew 
Shortrede, an entrepreneur, patriotic Scotsman, and one of the missionary community 
                                                 
12
 Originally known as Olyphant, Talbot, & Co., Olyphant and Company was one of four major American 
trading companies after the 1830s. D.W.C. Olyphant, the founder of the company, was an evangelical Protestant 
and affiliated his company heavily with the missionaries in China, refusing to carry opium and often 
transporting missionaries free of charge aboard his ships. 
 
13
 Yung, 25. 
 
14
 Yung, 28. 
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backers in Canton, offered to continue paying their educational fees if they agreed to study 
medicine at the University of Edinburgh in Scotland.15 Wong accepted the offer, but Yung 
Wing had his heart set on Yale. His teachers suggested he apply for the indigent fund at Yale, 
but Yung decided against it because it conditioned a path into the ministry. He “wanted the 
utmost freedom of action to avail [himself] of every opportunity to do the greatest good in 
China.”16 His mentors supported his decision, and Rev. Brown took steps to acquire other 
funds for Yung Wing. Brown encouraged a southern women’s missionary society, The 
Ladies Association of Savannah, Georgia, and the Olyphant Brothers to regularly send Yung 
money, and Yung Wing earned the rest through jobs as a boarding club student manager and 
eventually an assistant librarian.17 Though not academically well prepared for college, Yung 
Wing had caught the attention of many individuals inside the missionary and academic 
communities as an unusually bright and determined young man. 
By his own admission Yung Wing was ill-prepared for the rigors of Yale, yet the 
community seemed to carry him on their shoulders through his four years at the college. His 
math scores in particular put him in danger of failing, but Yung Wing cryptically said, “but 
for some unexplained reasons I was saved from such a catastrophe, and I squeezed through 
the second year with so low a mark that I was afraid to ask my division tutor…about it.”18 
While no evidence exists and Yung Wing may have been exaggerating the dismal state of his 
studies, his professors and friends had helped him when in financial crisis before. It is not 
unlikely they lobbied for his grades at least in this instance as well. His assistant librarianship 
                                                 
15
 LaFargue, 21. 
 
16
 Yung, 35. 
 
17
 LaFargue, 22. 
 
18
 Yung, 38. 
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for “Brothers in Unity,” one of the college’s debating societies, acquainted him with many in 
the community, and according to Yung Wing, “my nationality, of course, added piquancy to 
my popularity.”19 Yung Wing graduated in 1854. Despite his having become a naturalized 
citizen of the United States in 1852, his thoughts about what to do beyond graduation lay 
solely with the improvement of China.20 
Yung Wing did not immediately change or improve Sino-American relations in any 
meaningful way. Although he established a precedent for future generations, he was more a 
product of missionary efforts than a concerted exchange between China and the United 
States. With the Morrison School’s closing in 1850, the community in Canton no longer had 
the money or influence to repeat the “Yung Wing” experiment.21 However, Yung’s 
experiences did encourage him to open an education exchange between the two nations with 
a view to westernizing young Chinese students. Direct personal exposure, in Yung Wing’s 
mind, would better equip the students to deal with the influx of western technology China 
would need to advance from a feudal state. Upon returning to China in 1854, however, he 
found little support for such an effort. The Taiping Rebellion – a civil war waged from 1850 
to 1864 between pseudo-Christian discontents and the official Qing army – raged on, 
European foreign powers circled hungrily, and the Qing Dynasty stood upon the brink of 
dissolution. Yung Wing made a small fortune in the tea trade during the war, by shipping tea 
from Taiping-controlled regions and delivering it to imperial China.22 
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 Yung, 40. 
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 LaFargue, 22. 
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 Yung, 17. 
 
22
 LaFargue, 22-24. 
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The Taiping Rebellion inadvertently created the necessary conditions for the 
exchange and westernization of which Yung Wing dreamed. As the war continued, the 
imperial court handed off more and more power to regional commanders and later viceroys 
like Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang.23 Zeng Guofan in particular was an avid advocate of 
westernization, leading the so-called “self-strengthening” movement24 which sought to 
combine western technology with Chinese values during the 1860s. In 1863, as the war 
wound down, Zeng began looking to the future and, more importantly, to the West. Zeng 
heard through the mathematician Li Renshu of a Chinese man who had graduated from Yale 
and continued his correspondence with Americans. Needing someone whose Western 
expertise was unquestioned, Zeng summoned Yung Wing to Anjing for a meeting; shortly 
afterward Yung was sent to America to negotiate the purchase of machinery for an arsenal 
and factory in China. He also recommended Yung Wing for official governmental rank.25 As 
Yung Wing’s patron Zeng’s wealth and power grew over the course of the decade, so did the 
respect officials newly paid to Yung Wing, a man they had previously judged as more 
foreign than Chinese.  
                                                 
23
 Zeng Guofan was a Han Chinese military leader, administrator, and scholar with ties to Eastern China who 
led military campaigns against rebellious forces during the mid-nineteenth century. Li Hongzhang was another 
high ranking scholar-official and military leader who acquired even more prestige through military campaigns 
against rebels; he also attained the highest level of scholarship, the jinshi degree, and later served as China’s 
most valuable statesmen in the late 19th century, negotiating several treaties for China. 
 
24
 The “self-strengthening” movement (1861-1895) began during the later years of the Taiping Rebellion and 
lasted until the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) when Chinese forces, specifically the navy, were crushed 
by the Japanese. The reforms included heavy interest in Western-style modernization of the military – led by 
Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang – as well as deeper relations with the Western powers as evidenced by the 
establishment of the Zongli Yamen, the Office of Foreign Affairs. The movement ultimately failed due to 
wavering commitment and cool appraisals by conservative court officials as well as foreign encroachments and 
wars. 
 
25
 LaFargue, 26. 
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By the late 1860s, some Chinese leaders were ready to pursue educational 
opportunities abroad. Anson Burlingame,26 an American minister to China turned envoy 
extraordinary for the Chinese government, negotiated a treaty with Secretary of State 
William Seward in 1868 that promised the United States would allow Chinese students into 
any U.S. government school, including military academies. In 1870, Yung Wing was called 
back into service as an interpreter for commissioners dealing with the French in the aftermath 
of the Tianjin Massacre, in which rumors of infanticide stirred Chinese citizens to kill several 
French priests and nuns.27 During this assignment, Yung Wing impressed Zeng, Li, and other 
high-ranking commissioners with his plan to educate Chinese in the United States – so much 
so that they sent a memorial to the emperor suggesting such a course of action. Because they 
believed America’s advances in technology more practical to the education of Chinese 
students than Europe’s more liberal arts, the imperial court agreed with the commissioners’ 
plan to create the Chinese Educational Mission. They decided to send thirty students to the 
United States each year for four years with the understanding that each would return by 1887 
to serve China with their newfound western knowledge.28 The imperial court allotted the 
equivalent of a million and a half U.S. dollars in the 1870s for the project.29 
                                                 
26
 Anson Burlingame was an American politician and statesman from Massachusetts. Originally a congressman, 
he was later appointed by President Abraham Lincoln as minister to China in 1861. While there, he was 
perceived as especially sympathetic by the Chinese. In 1867 near the time of his retirement, he was picked by 
the Qing government to negotiate with foreign powers on its behalf, leading to the Burlingame Treaty in 1868. 
The Burlingame Treaty (1868) had several provisions. It recognized China’s right of eminent domain, allowed 
Chinese consuls at U.S. ports, called for religious tolerance for United States citizens in China, and granted 
other select privileges – except the right of naturalization. 
 
27
 In 1870, rumors of kidnappings circulated through Tianjin. At the same time, French Catholic nuns were 
known to rescue orphans. Tensions ran high. When the French consul forced his way into the magistrate’s 
yamen to put an end to the misconceptions, a mob gathered and the consul ordered his men to fire into it. The 
consul and his advisor were killed, and nearly sixty foreigners and Christian converts were murdered in the 
resultant riots. In response, the French government sent gunboats to the city to demand reprisals. Sixteen 
Chinese of dubious connection to the massacre were executed, and a formal apology mission was sent to France 
in 1871. 
 
 16 
By this point, Yung Wing’s original patron Zeng Guofan had fallen out of favor.30 Li 
Hongzhang, one of the other commissioners who sent the memorial and a protégé of Zeng, 
gained in influence in his place, and it was Li’s political stature that helped curry favor for 
the mission in the court. Another fateful step was the appointment of Chen Lanbin as co-
commissioner to win over conservatives in the court who felt Yung Wing held too many 
foreign beliefs. This decision would eventually lead to the mission’s demise. Another attempt 
to assuage jumpy conservatives in the court was Li’s decision to send Confucian teachers to 
America with the student groups to ensure traditional Chinese learning was not completely 
forsaken for western ways. Preparation for the journey, including rudimentary English 
training, was to begin in a school in Shanghai with the best thirty students sent off to 
America each year. 
In the beginning the newly created Chinese Educational Mission (C.E.M.) had other 
hurdles to cross. Though families from the southern and coastal provinces relatively familiar 
with foreigners responded to the invitation to send their sons for western training, northern 
and inland provinces sent almost no one. This forced Yung Wing to swiftly tour Guangdong, 
his home province, and especially in and around Canton to enlist family friends and old 
classmates from the Morrison School to send their sons on the mission. Over 70% of the 120 
boys were from the Canton area, while 37% came from Yung Wing’s home district of Hsiang 
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 Stacey Bieler, “Patriots” Or "traitors"?: A History of American Educated Chinese Students (Armonk, N.Y.: 
M.E. Sharpe, 2003), 4-5. 
 
29
 The New York Times, “THE CHINESE EDUCATIONAL MISSION,” August 18, 1873, 5, 
http://www.proquest.com. 
 
30
 Zeng Guofan fell out of favor in his later years due to two reasons. He failed to perform adequately in 
suppressing the Nian Rebellion in southern China after 1864, and he was relieved of his command by his 
protégé, Li Hongzhang. Li Hongzhang then succeeded him as viceroy of Zhili in 1870 when Zeng took a 
diplomatic stance during the Tianjin Massacre negotiations – contrary to the will of the imperial court. He died 
in 1872. 
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Shan.31 Inevitably, this lack of diversity gave Americans a lopsided view of China. The 
coolies, Chinese manual laborers in the United States, largely came from the southern and 
coastal provinces as well, so despite a lack of exposure to northern Chinese culture – which 
included the imperial Manchu court – the dichotomy of southern academics gave a pleasant 
contrast to the coolies Americans often viewed as little better than slaves. 
 Yung Wing then left for America before either the first batch of students or co-
commissioner Chen Lanbin. Under the advice of the new Yale President, Noah Porter III, 
Yung Wing arranged for accommodations with several American households among which 
to scatter the students with the aim of forcing those students to learn English more quickly. 
The mission so excited the people of the Connecticut Valley that once the students arrived 
more than enough host families had signed up to take them in. This strategy worked perhaps 
too well for the mission. While the majority of students speedily made American friends, 
received high marks, and adapted to New England discipline, it also became more and more 
difficult to interest the boys in their Confucian studies as they rapidly became 
Americanized.32 
 Accounts of the students’ individual experiences in America are slim, mostly coming 
secondhand from Chinese reports and American diaries and letters. The boys often felt out of 
place upon their arrival. For example, Yen Fu-Lee’s cousin encouraged his mother to 
volunteer Yen for the mission after hearing through the tea trade of Yung Wing and the new 
movement. Yen’s account of his arrival includes his first embarrassing encounter with his 
host mother, who hugged and kissed him – his first kisses since infancy.33 Despite initial 
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 LaFargue, 32-34. 
 
32
 LaFargue, 35. 
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awkwardness, most boys warmed to their new families quickly. Huang Kaijia, a “chubby” 
young man whose ability to make speeches earned him the nickname “Breezy Jack,” lived 
with the particularly strict Bartlett family. His closeness to the family remained such that he 
continued correspondence with Mrs. Bartlett, whom he referred to as his “American mother,” 
long after the mission was recalled.34 Huang Kaijia entered Yale in 1879, only two years 
before the project was abandoned. His nickname “Breezy Jack” is only one example of 
numerous American aliases the boys developed over the course of nine years, and these 
names not only stuck for use by American friends but by each other as well. 
 Yung Kwai, nephew of the famous Yung Wing, was fourteen when he first stepped 
onto American soil as part of the second detachment of Chinese students in 1873. Like many 
of his classmates, he quickly grew accustomed to American life – much to the discomfort of 
his Confucian teachers in the mission. While adoption of western mannerisms and practices 
merely frustrated the older conservatives, Yung Kwai’s conversion to Christianity in 1880 
and the subsequent cutting off of his queue – the symbol of fealty to the Qing emperor – 
infuriated them. After wrathful reports back home, the bureaucracy ordered Yung Kwai’s 
return to China and discontinued funds for his education. His uncle intervened, however, and 
with help from an American minister and pastor of the local Congregational church, 
Reverend J.H. Twichell, Yung Wing paid for the boy’s college expenses at what was then 
Yale College under one condition: Yung Kwai would have to use his education for the good 
of China by joining its diplomatic corps after graduation.35 Though now a Christian convert 
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in violation of Chinese law by removing his queue, Yung Kwai happily obliged to return to 
his country’s service after attending Yale. 
 Americans and especially locals in Connecticut were thrilled by the Chinese 
Educational Mission. The overwhelming response to Yung Wing’s requests for support 
displays just how widespread was the eagerness of Americans to impart western wisdom to 
the largely un-Christianized Chinese masses. In the grip of Manifest Destiny36, the American 
expansionist ideal made popular by Democratic journalist John L. O’Sullivan espousing the 
innate superiority of the United States, Americans felt a special paternalism for the eastern 
nations. For Americans, the C.E.M. was a primary example of the Chinese people growing 
up under the guiding hand of the United States. A New York Times article in 1873 claimed 
Zeng Guofan’s death the previous year was especially significant given the inauguration of 
the mission, for he had managed to overcome conservatism. In fact, it suggested his legacy 
both at home and abroad would eventually come to be known primarily as a proponent of the 
Chinese Educational Mission. The hyperbole does not end there. To close the article, the 
editors drew on the local Hartford Post in saying: 
To this…should be added the statement that the efforts of Kwoh Fan (sic), Hoong Chang and 
Jeh Ghang, were due to the increasing labors of Yung Wing, now of Hartford, who was a 
graduate of Yale College, and went back to China filled with the one purpose of securing the 
education of Chinese youth by having them sent to this country.37 
 
Hartford claimed Yung Wing as their own, and both the community and the country were 
quick to wrap the swiftly Americanizing students in a paternal embrace as well. 
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 Americanization concerned the Confucian tutors and especially Chen Lanbin, who 
felt extremely uncomfortable in this unfamiliar land. He was horrified that the boys quickly 
traded in their long silk gowns, emblems of the traditional Chinese scholar, for American 
trousers after some bullying and a few playground fights.38 After 1874, a permanent 
headquarters was built in Hartford that also served as a temporary residence for the students 
during the Confucian teaching sessions which took place there. Chen was recalled that same 
year, only to be named Chief Minister to the United States with Yung Wing as his associate a 
year later. Chen strongly disliked the United States, however, and waited until 1878 to return. 
When he did, he brought with him a new, even more conservative commissioner for the 
C.E.M., Wu Zideng. Chen Lanbin’s time home in China was not without effect; he had 
disparaged the mission in political circles, and Wu’s reports on bad management and poor 
Confucian manners on the part of the students only confirmed the suspicions of the powerful 
anti-foreign cadre in the court. Yung Wing’s marriage to a white woman, Mary Louise 
Kellogg, in 1875 also triggered the racial prejudices of conservative courtiers. American 
historian Thomas LaFargue speculates that as prejudice toward Chinese labor immigrants in 
California and other parts of the U.S. grew and the mission garnered more enemies, Li 
Hongzhang himself may have sent Wu to sabotage the mission.39 
 Yung’s ministerial duties often pulled him away from the mission after 1875, and so 
he could do little to moderate the damage Wu Zideng was doing to the mission’s reputation. 
The final straw came when Li Hongzhang discovered that Chinese students would not be 
allowed into American military academies without a special act of Congress, despite the 
privileges specifically laid out in the Burlingame Treaty. Li, always in tune with politics, 
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could no longer champion the mission. As things looked grim, President Porter of Yale 
started a petition which, among other things, enumerated the successes of the students in their 
studies and in their roles as unofficial ambassadors to the United States. The petition was 
signed by Laurenus Seelye, President of Smith College; Reverend Twichell who had only 
recently married Yung Wing to Mary Kellogg; and Mark Twain, Twichell’s personal friend. 
Twain’s influence reached as far as former President Ulysses S. Grant (in office 1869-1877). 
Grant had formerly used the last stop of his world tour in 1879 to plead to Li Hongzhang that 
the students in the C.E.M. should be allowed to complete their studies. In answer to Li’s 
complaints about the military academies, Grant suggested that the students could gain field 
experience in the American navy. At Twain’s insistence, Grant sent another letter in 1880 
urging Li to reconsider his decision, calling it a “mistake.”40 However, by March of 1881. Li 
had washed his hands of the mission, and on June 8, 1881, the government abolished the 
project and ordered its participants to return home. 
 The Chinese Educational Mission’s recall is interwoven with the story of the Chinese 
Exclusion Act’s passage.41 Largely concerned with limiting the high influx of manual labor 
from China to California, Western politicians had clamored for such a bill for years. The 
Fifteen Passenger Bill of 1879, which would have limited Chinese to 15 passengers per ship 
to the United States and made Pacific transport uneconomical, passed both houses before 
meeting President Rutherford Hayes’ veto. Hayes (in office 1877-1881) insisted he could not 
sign a bill that violated the immigration agreements in the 1868 Burlingame Treaty. In 
response to this failure, Congress modified the Burlingame Treaty in 1880, through a new 
agreement, the Angell Treaty, to allow limitations on Chinese immigration. Immediately a 
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bill was introduced and passed soon after suspending Chinese immigration for twenty years, 
but President Chester Arthur vetoed it, essentially claiming it went too far.42 Two years later, 
Congress finally managed to place definite limits on Chinese immigration. The Chinese 
Exclusion Act passed on May 6, 1882 set an ugly precedent: it was the first law targeting one 
specific nationality or race for exclusion from immigration. 
What changed in U.S.-China Relations during those two years? In 1881 the Chinese 
Educational Mission was recalled, and many constitutents’ only positive connection with 
China had been removed by what many viewed as close-minded conservatives in charge of 
the Chinese government. Historian Andrew Gyory adds credence to this theory of political 
expediency. He claims that rather than a solely Californian issue led by Dennis Kearney, 
populist rabble-rouser and founder of the xenophobic blue-collar Workingman’s Party of 
California opposed to indentured coolie labor from China, or evidence of national racism, the 
bill on Chinese immigration was the product of several politicians’ attempts at politicking at 
a time when the intensely pro-labor Democratic Party was on the rise. Western and Northern 
congressmen alike couched their arguments in terms of the working man, while Southern 
politicians raised the specter of another civil war due to the Chinese race invasion.43 In no 
recorded political speech was the Chinese Educational Mission discussed as a shining 
example of American influence on Chinese immigrants because its removal, more than 
anything else, allowed the political backlash against the entire Chinese “race,” who, with the 
exception of the C.E.M. students, were largely portrayed in the media as inferior heathens 
and listless coolie laborers. 
                                                 
42
 Kitty Calavita, “The Paradoxes of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion 
Acts, 1882-1910,” Law & Social Inquiry 25, no. 1 (Winter, 2000): 4-5. 
 
43
 Andrew Gyory, Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: The University 
of North Carolina Press, 1998), 6. 
 23 
 Zheng Caoru, the new Chinese minister to the United States replacing Chen Lanbin, 
denounced the Chinese Exclusion Act soundly, but his predecessor had so frustrated 
Washington’s politicians that his voice carried no weight.44 The American Northeast was 
largely baffled by the successive acts of the recall and the exclusion act. A professor in 
Hoboken who saw his student returned to China commented that “there is no unfriendly spirit 
here” against the Chinese students so rudely removed.45 Yung Wing was abroad during the 
passage of the Exclusion Act, trying to rally support to re-establish the mission in the United 
States, or at the very least to secure decent jobs for his former students. Both quests failed in 
the face of the sudden rage over the Exclusion Act. Yung Wing returned to the U.S. in 1883 
to find his wife very ill. Her death in 1886, so shortly after the utter collapse of Yung’s dream 
of westernizing China, was “enough to crush [his] spirit.”46 
 Despite the general rancor in official channels, the students departed amiably. Though 
missed by their host families and leaving behind Yung Wing, a distraught commissioner, the 
students appeared to bear no ill will toward either China or the United States. They assumed 
naturally that bureaucratic jobs awaited them back in China, and based on the overwhelming 
support of the Connecticut Valley, they also assumed the entirety of the U.S. would have 
preferred that their studies continued. Not even the prejudice of the West dampened their 
spirits as they prepared to embark from San Francisco. Instead, the students participated in a 
friendly game of baseball with an Oakland team. The unorthodox pitches of future diplomat 
Liang Tunyen effectively won the game and sent the Chinese students back to China 
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smiling.47 As previously mentioned, some students even opted to stay in the United States 
through official favors: Yung Kwai, for example, eventually took up the post of interpreter 
and diplomat for the Chinese legation in Washington, D.C. His classmate Tan Yew-fun also 
converted to Christianity and graduated from Yale in 1883, but died only a scant few weeks 
later.48 
The Americanized students had no idea just how little respect their stature 
commanded on their return to China. When Tong Wing Ho was asked by an American 
reporter why the students returned to China in American dress, he responded that it was in 
courtesy to the land of their education and that “…placing it as a matter of convenience I 
would rather assume the Oriental style. We have a brilliant prospect before us and can not 
afford to risk anything by offending public taste.”49 Given Tong’s statement to the San 
Francisco Chronicle in 1881, the students’ return to China was ignominious at best. Their 
dress did offend the conservative officials, and their welcome showed it. Forced to carry their 
own bags like peasants, they were rounded up into what Huang Kaijia later described to Mrs. 
Bartlett as a building akin to a “Turkish Prison” in order to be effectively debriefed. China 
saw them as “denationalized beings.”50 With the Chinese Exclusion Act enacted in 1882, 
their fall from grace only grew longer and more depressing; most were forced to start their 
careers at the bottom of the Chinese bureaucracy often as little better than minor 
undersecretaries. 
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A select few fought to return to the United States where, despite general prejudice, 
the former students did not feel like pariahs compared to the situation in their home country. 
In 1883, Jang Ting-Seong stowed away on a ship bound for Korea, believing it was headed 
for Indonesia where he planned to find another ship to take him to the United States. Luckily, 
one of the passengers on board was Tang Shaoyi, a former classmate of Jang’s in the C.E.M. 
now enlisted in the government bureaucracy. Tang took pity on Jang and arranged his 
passage to America, where he became a consulting engineer and a designer and builder of the 
Brooklyn Bridge. Yen Fu-Lee also remained in the United States with little connection to his 
homeland. He wrote the popular children’s book “When I was a Boy in China” and edited 
several American magazines.51 
 The vast majority of C.E.M. students felt an obligation to their country despite their 
initial harsh treatment upon their recall. One of the assistant commissioners at the close of the 
mission stated that the reason for the students’ withdrawal was not fear of Americanization 
but eagerness to put their knowledge to use in the nation’s new telegraph lines.52 Liang 
Tunyen, a former boarder of the Bartlett family in Hartford, gained special recognition after 
being employed as an English teacher for the Telegraph College in Tianjin in 1881. His 
reputation grew, and in 1884 Li Hongzhang’s political rival Zhang Zhidong, a staunch 
supporter of modernization and reform, appointed Liang his secretary. Liang was unique 
among the students for the broadness of his success. Less successful but equally notable was 
Huang Kaijia, still known to his friends as “Breezy Jack.” Huang Kaijia worked as a 
secretary for several industrial projects and later for multiple princely envoys and diplomatic 
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missions. He died while returning from the Portsmouth [New Hampshire] Peace Conference 
that ended the Russo-Japanese War in 1905.53 
 Many students joined the fledgling Chinese navy, following the wishes of viceroy Li 
Hongzhang. Their efforts were not enough to correct the flaws in ship design owing to rushed 
construction, but their administration and command were excellent. Six of the vessels at the 
Battle of Pagoda Anchorage in the Sino-French War (1884-85)54 were commanded by former 
students of the C.E.M. Though four of the six commanders lost their lives in the process, the 
American Minister to China used the naval officers’ bravery to encourage sending more 
Chinese to the United States for their education. After all, the Chinese Exclusion Act forbade 
only labor immigration, not students visiting the U.S. for temporary study. 
 Many of the students found work in diplomatic circles as the reactionary 
conservatism that had taken hold in the later 1870s slowly dissipated. Tang Shaoyi, whose 
uncle had been a classmate of Yung Wing’s at the Morrison School, is perhaps the best 
example of a rise in the domestic influence of the Chinese Educational Mission students. 
Upon returning to China, he was selected as a rising political star and appointed as Yuan 
Shikai’s55 personal secretary. In 1900, during the Boxer Rebellion56, Tang served as an 
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intermediary between the domestic and foreign forces in Tianjin. After stints as Vice-
President of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister of Communications, and Governor General of 
Manchuria, Tang Shaoyi eventually capped his career off as the first Prime Minister of the 
Chinese Republic in 1912.57  
1908 saw the deaths of the expertly manipulative and longtime conservative Empress 
Dowager Cixi and her nephew, the Guangxu Emperor; the Empress Dowager Cixi in 
particular had long foiled the efforts of Chinese progressives. This paved the way for Liang 
Tunyen’s attempt to revive the process of sponsoring Chinese students abroad. When 
scholar-official and reformer Zhang Zhidong took over the responsibilities of Yuan Shikai 
(who had been relieved of his duties following the death of his political ally Empress 
Dowager Cixi) in 1908, he appointed Liang Tunyen as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Working 
with his old classmate Tang Shaoyi, the two negotiated a deal which led to the return of the 
Boxer Indemnities58 in the form of scholarships for Chinese students to attend American 
colleges.59 Liang Tunyen founded Tsinghua University in 1911 for students to attend in 
preparation for studies abroad.60 Today Tsinghua University is not only one of the top 
colleges in China, but it is also internationally ranked. A list of its alumni includes numerous 
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important Chinese politicians and diplomats, including the current President and Party 
Secretary Hu Jintao. 
 
 Liang and Tang’s negotiation of the Boxer Indemnity scholarships became a turning 
point in Sino-American relations and the history of Chinese students abroad. Once again 
China sent its students to the United States in droves for technological and philosophical 
training, hoping to imbue its youth with the magic the West seemed to possess. Ignorant of or 
apathetic about the United States’ paternalistic viewpoint on Chinese students in America, 
China wasted no time or effort in taking advantage of the scholarships. In 1909, Yung 
Wing’s nephew, Yung Kwai, met the first group of indemnity students in Washington D.C.61 
He traveled with them to Springfield, Massachusetts where he had attended high school, 
effectively passing the torch from the first generation to the second. His uncle Yung Wing, 
whose spirit had been so crushed after 1886, was revived again and began writing his 
autobiography. He died on May 29, 1912, no longer a broken man. 
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Chapter 2: “Unofficial Envoys” 
The Boxer Indemnity Scholarships, 1900-1949 
 
 American educated Chinese will be a huge bridge across the Pacific Ocean between America 
and China, over which American civilization travels. They will be a marvelous means of transporting 
American ideas to and distributing them through the vast kingdom. They will be able to insure a 
peace and trade in the Far East that treaties and military forces can not insure. In one word, these 
students will be the most natural medium and most effective instruments through and with which 
American civilization, or rather American university education, can exert its wonderful influence on 
the new China.62 
- T.Y. Chang, 1907 Alumnus of the University of California 
 
They had no official diplomatic status, but American-educated Chinese of the second 
generation emerged as the great hope of a new China. Between 1900 and 1949, China 
experienced perhaps the most turbulent years in its political history. The Middle Kingdom 
shifted from a long-practiced system of dynastic rule to republicanism, with warlordism, 
outside aggression, and civil war tossed into the mix. China began the century in the midst of 
a rebellion that drew the ire of western civilization down upon the Qing Empire; by the 
century’s midpoint it was a war-weary nation subject to the unique communist ideology of 
Mao Zedong.63 In the middle of such a tumultuous history, some Chinese students scrambled 
to western and particularly American universities in hopes of returning with the keys to 
Chinese modernization. In awe of republicanism, American virtues, and western technology, 
these students strived in the face of crisis at home to convince the United States of China’s 
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worth and potential. In this regard, despite many troubles in China, the students experienced 
considerable success. 
This chapter covers an extremely important period in the history of American-
educated Chinese students. It begins with bridging the gap between the recall of the C.E.M. 
students in 1881 and the U.S. decision to remit its portion of the Boxer Indemnity in 1908. 
The chapter then seeks to explain the origins and reasoning behind the Boxer Indemnity 
scholarships as well as their eventual implementation. Once this groundwork has been laid, 
more detail is revealed about the successes and failures of Chinese students to affect Sino-
American Relations throughout the troubles of the early twentieth century. Finally, the 
chapter closes with the end of the Chinese Civil War,64 the separation between the 
Guomindang on Taiwan and the communists on the mainland, and the effects of Chinese 
students on the U.S. response. 
 
 The United States did not see a complete lack of Chinese students between 1881 and 
1908 –from the years the Chinese Educational Mission was recalled to the signing of the 
agreement establishing the Boxer Indemnity scholarships. However, these intervening years 
did see a change in the nature of Chinese education abroad. By 1906, approximately 300 
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Chinese students were in America.65 Rather than tight knit groups with heavy government 
supervision, a new trend developed: individual Chinese students came to America with ties to 
American missionary movements and either wealthy Chinese or (more often) American 
benefactors. Some managed to gain the support of provincial governments, but most students 
traveling to America after 1881 did so under the auspices of the Christian American Board 
for Foreign Missions.66 
This is not to say that the Qing imperial government made no official efforts, but such 
forays were far less publicized and extensive than the C.E.M. had been. Granted, as early as 
1902, a small group of students from the Beiyang School based in Tianjin arrived in 
California. They were the first officially government-sponsored students since the Chinese 
Educational Mission was recalled two decades earlier. It was from the roots of this group at 
the University of California that the Chinese Students’ Alliance, an extremely influential 
organization promoting Chinese nationalism and political activism over the next forty years, 
was founded on the basis, as historian Ye Weili observes, of “instill[ing] patriotism in local, 
American-born Chinese youth, whose loyalty to China the students…had found wanting.”67 
Other than this historic action, the Beiyang School’s students are notable primarily for a 
hesitant return in official government policy to the prioritization of western learning. 
Some of this was driven no doubt by feelings of inferiority following the disastrous 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900. Originally attempting to overthrow the Qing Dynasty and expel all 
foreign influence in China, the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, or “Boxers” as 
the Westerners referred to them, began cutting a merciless swathe through parts of northern 
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China. In desperation, the Empress Dowager Cixi backed the Boxers in their xenophobic and 
anti-Christian efforts, but the combined might of European and American military forces 
arrived to break the Boxer siege of Beijing. Unfortunately, over 500 foreign missionaries and 
Christian converts had already been killed.  
In some cases, such as that of Fei Qihe, this violent reaction against foreign influence 
and especially Christianity instigated efforts to cross the Pacific and study in a Christian 
nation amongst the congregations who had funded and often provided their education in 
China. Many of these individual students prior to 1908 were already Christian converts. Fei 
was born into a Chinese Christian family in 1879. In 1898, Fei graduated from North China 
College, a school established and partially run by Congregationalist missionaries from the 
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. Teaching in Fenzhou, he soon 
became acquainted with Charles and Eva Price, members of the Oberlin Mission (part of the 
American Board) and graduates of Ohio’s Oberlin College. He grew close to the Prices, and 
when they were killed in the turmoil of 1900, Fei took a strip of cloth provided by Charles 
Price from Fenzhou to Tianjin to inform the American consul of the missionaries’ deaths.68 
Fei remained in contact with the family and friends of the Prices at Oberlin in Ohio. 
In 1901, the Board offered him the opportunity to study at Oberlin College with the intention 
of taking over for the Prices in Fenzhou upon his return. Due to the Chinese Exclusion Act 
and other restrictions, immigration officers in San Francisco were deeply suspicious of all 
incoming Chinese. Fei and his classmate H.H. Kung spent weeks on a crowded ship and then 
more time in stuffy detention sheds with bars on the windows as diplomatic envoys worked 
out technicalities in their passports. They did not reach Oberlin until 1903, but they arrived in 
time for the dedication of a memorial to the murdered missionaries. Their presence helped 
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reassure the missionary community of China’s potential for Christian conversion. The 
Oberlin yearbook actually portrayed them as “mascots,” and it is clear that the missionaries 
viewed them as signs of their own progress in modernizing China. Fei was not stupid (as the 
M.A. in Education he would receive from Yale University proved), and he could see the 
patronizing manners in which some in the American Board used him. Though indebted to 
and friendly with many missionaries at Oberlin, Fei left America with a deep sense of 
frustration largely due to the distasteful way in which most Americans and particularly local 
governments treated Chinese people; his time in the detention shed served as a prickly 
reminder. Despite bittersweet memories of his time in America, Fei worked the rest of his 
life to prolong a relationship between the Chinese people and American missionaries through 
the YMCA and government posts in the Guomindang government.69 
Fei Qihe personified a bridge between American Christians and a larger Chinese 
populace in the years immediately following the Boxer Rebellion. In 1905, soon after the late 
1902 renewal of America’s Chinese Exclusion Act and the expiration in 1904 of the earlier 
U.S.-China treaty on immigration,70 Chinese launched an anti-U.S. protest and began a 
boycott of American goods in China – the first such protest in the history of U.S.-China 
relations. The boycott was called for by Chinese merchants in the United States, and they 
swiftly rallied Chinese in China and overseas to their cause. Students hopeful to study in the 
United States were among the participants. Several Americans erroneously believed they 
recognized the source of Chinese frustration over their mistreatment in the United States. 
Among them was Harvard President Charles Eliot who insisted the boycott would quickly 
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end if the activist students associated with it were appeased. Harvard, Yale, Cornell, and 
Wellesley offered scholarships for a very limited number of students. Despite its small scale, 
the effort paid off when 600 candidates took examinations for the latter three schools alone.71 
These actions paved the way for the educational experience which forged so many of Fei’s 
contacts and for future opportunities through the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship program, 
which began in 1908. 
The genesis of the Boxer Indemnity Scholarships is as important to the historical 
impact of American-educated Chinese as its implementation. In negotiations over the Boxer 
Protocol in 1901,72 the United States originally asked for a lower sum in reparations than the 
Qing government eventually offered. Missionaries, already sympathetic to the plight of the 
average Chinese family, criticized the American government for demanding what they 
believed to be an obscenely large amount of money. When they learned the United States 
government had received over $24 million, over twice the original numbers proposed 
(roughly $11 million), American missionaries clamored for a return of the excess. However, 
William Rockhill, the American foreign minister in Beijing, convinced President Theodore 
Roosevelt and his cabinet in 1907 the Qing government was incapable of using the money 
responsibly.73 An alternative solution had to be arranged. 
The Chinese capitalized on this sentiment through Liang Cheng, one of the graduates 
of the C.E.M. who was sent to Washington, D.C. in 1902 as minister to the United States.74 
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As minister to the United States, he cleverly recognized one of America’s greatest 
weaknesses at the time: overreaching fatherly pride. The United States viewed China and its 
people as children – children with potential, but children all the same. Understanding 
America’s tendency to view itself as a city on a hill,75 Liang wrote Secretary of State John 
Hay saying, “If your honorable country would take the lead [in returning excess indemnity 
payments], wherever the voice of righteousness spread, those countries would rise and follow 
it.”76 
Though Liang Cheng’s voice was surely the first and perhaps most influential on the 
Chinese side, two other former C.E.M. students saw the idea through to fruition. Liang 
Tunyen negotiated with William Rockhill in Beijing over the intricacies of the plan in 1907 
once a new Secretary of State, Elihu Root, convinced President Roosevelt of near certain 
public approval on both sides of the Pacific.77 The scholarships would be rendered at the 
discretion of the Chinese government and were issued from 1909 through 1947 (with the 
exception of 1938-1944, years during the second Sino Japanese War). Tang Shaoyi, though 
originally arguing for more infrastructural benefits from returned funds, eventually became a 
public relations symbol for American-educated Chinese in the United States. Tang Shaoyi 
and Liang Tunyen sequentially held the position of Vice President of the Board of Foreign 
Affairs in 1907 and 1908 respectively, and immediately after the conclusion of the deal Tang 
was appointed Special Ambassador to Washington.78 Tang Shaoyi not only attended the 
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signing of Roosevelt’s executive order on December 28, 1908, but he invited more than a 
hundred Chinese students currently in the United States to attend with him.79 
This return to a progressive westernized view on education was not spontaneous. 
China had begun extensive educational reforms around 1905, when both Chinese nationalism 
in the form of foreign boycotts and a reemphasis on western education began to pick up 
speed. The latter originated in the traumatic abolition of the civil service examinations after a 
five year suspension required by the Boxer Protocol,80 signaling a clear shift in education 
policy. This reform in education and U.S.-China relations occurred alongside the deaths in 
1908 of the Guangxu Emperor and the Empress Dowager Cixi only a day later. Perhaps 
shaken by her experiences on the run from foreign troops during the Boxer Rebellion – while 
troops attacked Beijing, the Empress Dowager helped set into motion the reforms in the final 
years of the Qing Dynasty. Many of the C.E.M. students like Liang Cheng, Liang Tunyen, 
and Tang Shaoyi, formerly pushed to the margins of government and shunned due to their 
American influence, were brought into power during this time as the fortunes of reformers 
improved. 
One reason the former C.E.M. students were called up was their experience with 
Western powers. Not only Chinese students from America but those from other Western 
countries as well found new footing in this reform-friendly environment. Diplomats like 
Liang Cheng and Liang Tunyen understood the United States self-image of a doting father to 
more child-like nations, especially after the Spanish-American war of 1898 and the seizure of 
the Philippines as a new American colony. These men shrewdly took advantage of such 
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emotions to give precedence to a very salient idea in China: the importance of education. 
However, they also realized that through education and a usage of students as “unofficial 
envoys” to develop relationships with American citizens, China could also eventually gain 
the help in infrastructure and technology the struggling nation so desperately needed. 
American politicians and statesmen were not sentimental fools; they recognized the Boxer 
Indemnity program as a chance for American-directed reform in China.81 
To this end, China originally expected three things of students: first, Chinese students 
“should bring home [to China] the American spirit, such as cooperation, enterprise, loyalty, 
and discipline” and prepare to lead upon returning; second, they should study new 
technology; and thirdly they should teach Americans about Chinese culture and society.82 
Even before the fall of the Qing Dynasty in 1912, students were also expected to become 
familiar with democracy while studying in America, in preparation for a promised 
parliamentary government in 1917.83 China had very specific plans for their students in the 
United States. In fact, Tang Shaoyi’s invitation to the signing of Roosevelt’s executive order 
was not merely cordial. He took the opportunity to advise each student in attendance on their 
studies, suggesting a broad curriculum of study including engineering, liberal arts, debate, 
and Spanish in preparation for South American diplomatic positions.84 
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Despite the grand spectacle at Roosevelt’s signing of the Boxer indemnity remission 
executive order on December 28, 1908, the Chinese government either made no attempt to 
engage the American press, or Chinese students were simply old news. Only a blurb entitled 
“Will Study In America” appeared in the Washington Post concerning the implementation of 
the scholarships.85 Likewise, the number of Chinese students in the U.S. did not spike after 
1908. Enrollment under the Boxer Indemnity program increased gradually, largely due to the 
unique process through which it was managed. Two tiers of examinations narrowed down the 
initial field of 640 candidates in 1909 to a small group of forty-seven young men – mostly 
from western-style missionary schools in China’s larger cities.86 Liang Tunyen’s founding of 
Tsinghua University in 1908 was originally intended solely as a highly competitive 
preparatory school for students planning to study abroad – particularly in the United States. 
The school confused many of its students upon opening, however, because of its bewildering 
mixture of Chinese and American educational ideals – ranging from classic Chinese literature 
to Shakespeare and Abraham Lincoln.87 Still, enrollment remained high and by 1918 the 
number of students in America had risen to 1,200.88 
 Unlike the C.E.M. in the 1870s, the Boxer Indemnity Scholarship program did not 
operate in one central location in the United States. Instead, it was spread out over the entire 
country, though definite concentrations of scholarship recipients occurred in the East and 
Midwest (See Table 1). Much like Huang Kaijia and Liang Tunyen in the 1870s, these 
students were viewed as exotic curiosities. The dramatic distances among which the students  
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were spread coupled with a sense of isolation within American colleges consisting mostly of 
whites led to a fierce rise in both Chinese 
nationalism and associational behavior. 
Eventually, this led to the formation of the 
Chinese Students’ Alliance to combat 
loneliness and bridge the gaps between universities.  
If China wanted to learn about democracy and America was eager to teach, the 
Chinese Students’ Alliance offered an ideal opportunity. As mentioned previously, the 
Chinese Students’ Alliance was originally founded in 1902 at a Congregational church near 
the University of California in San Francisco. It served as a voluntary organization with the 
major purpose of “unit[ing] all Chinese students on the broad, general ground of 
patriotism.”90 Similar groups arose in Chicago, Ithaca, and Berkeley over the next three 
years, and in August 1905 thirty-six students founded the Chinese Students’ Alliance of the 
Eastern States.91 In response, the Western units combined to form the Pacific Coast Chinese 
Students’ Association, but as of 1909 neither organization had been incorporated into the 
World Chinese Students’ Federation, instead choosing to remain an independent American 
entity. Already in 1909 the Eastern Alliance was notable for publishing the Chinese Students’ 
Monthly, a magazine with political and popular articles written for and by Chinese students, 
all in English. This magazine became a central tool for American Chinese to express their 
views and opinions. In keeping with their responsibilities to the American Chinese 
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Table 1: Top Five American Colleges and Universities 
Granting Degrees to Chinese Students, 1854-195389 
Institution Location  Degrees Total 
Columbia New York 1,834 
U of Michigan Michigan 1,300 
M.I.T. Massachusetts 734 
Harvard Massachusetts 647 
U of Illinois Illinois 603 
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community at large, they also published the Chinese Students’ Annual, entirely in Chinese, 
with similar content.92 In 1911, these two groups united into the broad Chinese Students’ 
Alliance and remained active, supported by a sizable membership during the first third of the 
twentieth century. 
 This unity was made possible by Vi Kyuin Wellington Koo, an enterprising student 
who later became a crucial link between America and China. Koo was born in Shanghai to a 
family of four in 1887. Koo’s family was already familiar with Western history and ideas, 
and for this reason they named Koo after the Duke of Wellington who had defeated 
Napoleon at Waterloo. With his father’s monetary support as a deputy bursar for the Chinese 
Merchants’ Navigation Company, Koo attended St. John’s, a missionary school in Shanghai, 
where he further developed his western connections before sailing to America to enroll in 
Cook Academy in New York in 1904. 
 From the beginning, Koo had ambitions to revolutionize Chinese diplomacy. In 1905, 
Koo left the academy to attend Columbia University and study political science; there, he 
quickly ascended to the presidency of the New York iteration of the Chinese Students’ 
Alliance. From the beginning, V.K. Wellington Koo dabbled in Chinese politics. He met with 
Chinese commissioners studying western-style governments in 1906 and pushed the 
envelope with conservative Chinese by inviting Yung Wing to speak at an Alliance summer 
conference in 1907. He also ventured into American high society with the help of his 
professors. But it was in 1908 that he began his most lasting contribution to Chinese students 
in the United States when he attended a Joint Conference on unifying the various sections of 
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the Alliance. This was finally accomplished in 1911 with the creation of a formal 
constitution. Koo was widely credited as the primary founder of the Alliance.93 
 Koo’s vision of a broad organization to stir political awareness, sustain a network of 
returned students from America, and moderate American perceptions of China and Chinese 
people quickly took shape. This last objective began before the club was ever consolidated 
and carried on after its demise, mostly because throughout the second generation period this 
activity occurred at the local level. Future historian Hong Ye broke from the former method 
of displaying China as a backward miserable land when he helped created the Chinese 
exhibit at the Methodist Church’s Centenary World Exposition in Columbus, Ohio. Instead, 
he focused on “the solidarity of the human family and the duty of brotherly love,” both 
values which Americans could latch onto with pride.94 Students also pressed for a balancing 
of the educational exchange, hoping to convince universities to open new Chinese language 
departments. They met with limited success before the Alliance’s collapse in 1931; the 
Washington, D.C.-based American Council of Learned Societies joined in advocating 
scholarships and fellowships for serious Chinese study.95 Many local and regional 
conferences also sparked interest in the burgeoning young patriots and their vision of China, 
as evidenced by countless local news clippings collected by Henry Dana Fearing, a friend of 
Chinese ambassador Liang Cheng.96 For multiple generations of Americans, outside of the 
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portrayal of China and Chinese by Hollywood and through dime novels, Chinese students 
were a primary source for understanding the Chinese people and their culture. 
 Changes in China during the years 1911 and 1912 began to reflect this sense of a new 
China with enormous potential consequences. These years witnessed the collapse of the Qing 
Empire – the last Chinese dynasty. Despite all its attempts at reform, it was too late for the 
Qing. The Wuchang Uprising on October 10, 1911 ignited revolutionary fervor across China. 
Frightened and weak, the Qing court pulled the politically savvy General Yuan Shikai and 
his Beiyang army from northern China to quell the rebellion.97 By 1912, the central 
revolutionaries had gained control over most of South China and had elected their leader Sun 
Yat-sen98 President of the Republic of China. Rather than crush the revolutionaries, Yuan 
negotiated for the abdication of the emperor in exchange for the presidency of the new 
nation, a compromise his military strength made necessary for the new republic. 
Revolutionary fervor remained, but a pall of militarism hung over China. 
Initially astir with democracy and a new national assembly, the Chinese Republic 
quickly deteriorated from threats both within and without. Yuan Shikai zealously suppressed 
Sun’s Guomindang political party99 and attempted, unsuccessfully, to reestablish monarchy 
                                                 
97
 See footnote 54 on page 26. Yuan Shikai had been in forced retirement since the death in 1908 of his patron, 
Empress Dowager Cixi. Yuan was widely connected with Cixi’s house arrest of the Guangxu Emperor and even 
implicated in his death. Between 1895 and 1911, Yuan had taken the opportunity to consolidate his army in 
northern China. 
 
98
 Sun Yat-sen was born in Xiangshan (Zhongshan), Guangdong in 1966. At age thirteen, he moved to Hawaii 
to live with his elder brother, and eventually attended the prestigious Iolani School. After Hawaii was forcibly 
annexed by the American government, Sun was declared a U.S. citizen in 1904. American history influenced 
his political idealism and his conversion to Christianity. Increasingly disillusioned by the Qing Empire’s 
domestic policies and traditional Chinese beliefs, Sun founded the Revive China Society in 1894 in Hawaii. In 
1905, he organized and led the revolutionary organization Tongmenghui. He was in the United States gathering 
support for a revolution when the Wuchang Uprising occurred. 
 
99
 The Guomindang (GMD), or Kuomintang in present-day Taiwan, was founded on August 25, 1912 from the 
various revolutionary groups which overthrew the Qing Dynasty. It can be traced as far back as Sun Yat-sen’s 
 43 
in China. In 1915, Japan asserted itself with the infamous Twenty-One Demands100 – many 
of which infringed heavily on the sovereignty of the frail nation. Finally, in 1919 the first 
World War concluded with the Treaty of Paris and American President Woodrow Wilson’s 
promises of self-determination; such promises collapsed, however, and Chinese students both 
at home and abroad rode a wave of anti-Western sentiment. 
The gravity of such events was not lost on the students in America or their 
predecessors from the C.E.M. Most of the first generation of Chinese students was swept 
away by these developments, clinging to the sinking wreckage of the Qing Empire – many 
only held power through patrons in the Qing court. When they fell, many of these new 
diplomats and administrators from the first generation of students simply retired and sank 
into obscurity. Only Tang Shaoyi remained politically important in the post-1912 regime. 
Students at home, however, were much more active at the advent of the new Chinese 
Republic. At a Midwest conference of the Chinese Students’ Club in 1912, 150 students 
celebrated their new nation by raising a new flag and singing their new national anthem.101 
Many felt the Chinese Students’ Alliance was more important than ever now, because in 
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America the Alliance served as “a laboratory of self-government” to prepare the Chinese 
leaders of tomorrow.102 
This type of thinking rang especially true for two outstanding students of the second 
generation: V.K. Wellington Koo and Hu Shi. Koo was recruited by Yuan Shikai through 
Tang Shaoyi in 1912 to serve as the new President’s English secretary. As a testimony to 
Koo’s widespread fame in the United States, newspapers from around the nation ran articles 
on his appointment.103 One such article in the New York Times perhaps spoke to Yuan’s 
reasoning for choosing such a young and idealistic individual. In it, Koo defended the 
fledgling republic against a skeptical reporter, stating, “…the present Government will 
become established and China will remain a republic. The turbulent revolutionary conditions 
are fast passing away.”104 Koo’s statement was made on April Fools’ Day, April 1, 1912, 
perhaps fitting timing considering that roughly three years later Yuan Shikai would dissolve 
the legislature and declare himself Emperor, only to be dethroned with the aid of his former 
protégé, Tang Shaoyi.105 
The revolution also shoved one other student into international prominence, but in the 
United States rather than China. Hu Shi, a philosophy student at Cornell, gained renown in 
the U.S. as a consummate public speaker, capturing the attention of many Americans after 
1912. Like many of his fellow students, Hu Shi was appalled by Japan’s humiliating Twenty-
One Demands in 1915, but when his classmates panicked and made plans to return home Hu 
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Shi published a paper insisting, “Let us DO OUR DUTY which is TO STUDY.”106 Certainly 
one student took this advice to heart and wrote a prize-winning essay condemning Japan; the 
New York Times gave the essay and the plight it discussed a particularly sympathetic 
treatment.107 Hu Shi also signed a letter written at Cornell in 1915 protesting the Alliance’s 
favorable position on Yuan Shikai following his dissolution of the legislature and scuttling of 
the constitution. Clearly unafraid to speak his mind, Hu also focused on preserving ties with 
the United States by taking straw votes of Chinese students during U.S. elections and 
continuing to speak at engagements praising the relationship of the two countries. Hu 
returned to China in 1917 once his studies were complete but continued to reach out to 
Chinese students in America, stressing baihua (vernacular Chinese) as the language of 
revolution following the political firestorm surrounding the Versailles Treaty on May 4, 
1919.108 More than anyone, Hu has been credited as modernizing China culturally during 
what he termed the “Chinese Enlightenment.”109 
Meanwhile, V. K. Wellington Koo managed to escape the fate usually awaiting 
students of failed mentors in China due mostly to his U.S. connections. At the time of Yuan’s 
death in 1916, Koo had been awarded the position of Chinese representative to the United 
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States. He reestablished contact with and reinvigorated the Student Alliance. The Alliance’s 
new energy showed when in 1919 it was revealed that the pro-Japanese Chinese minister of 
communication had signed a secret treaty with the Japanese granting them former German 
rights and privileges in Shandong province. The China Society of America, wishing to 
remain publicly aloof from politics, unleashed the students instead with a “request” to the 
Alliance to “prepare a statement for the American public” regarding the treaty.110 In 
accepting its charge, the Students’ Alliance joined with several national organizations in the 
United States to protest the treaty publicly.111 Koo had actually been chosen to attend the 
Paris Peace Conference, and successfully argued the validity of student demands not to sign 
the treaty. Even more impressively, he successfully steered Chinese foreign policy in a pro-
American direction after 1919, even after America ignored such Chinese protests and signed 
the Treaty of Versailles (though the U.S. Congress never ratified the treaty).112 
After 1919, Japan’s aggression gradually increased. Although the city of Qingdao in 
Shandong province was returned in 1921 at the Washington Conference concerning naval 
power among the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, Chinese demands for regaining 
sovereignty from Japan in certain ports was categorically ignored. Over the next few years, 
Japan also claimed many special interests in Manchuria, China’s northernmost province, 
something which drew particular ire from the Chinese Students’ Alliance. They called 
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attention to Japan’s rapidly growing power by putting the nation on mock trial in a strange 
publicity stunt. It succeeded insomuch as it was reported by the Washington Post.113 In 1925, 
conflict between Chinese workers and Japanese mill owners in Shanghai erupted into anti-
Japanese sentiment, launching the May 30th Movement, a series of strikes and anti-Japanese 
demonstrations that lasted through 1926. This time, the Republic of China publicly worked 
through the Chinese Students’ Alliance to bring their grievances to the attention of President 
Calvin Coolidge, whose cabinet had hinted at landing marines in Shanghai to protect 
American lives.114 The students begged Coolidge to remember the “peace and friendship” 
between the two nations and to offer American diplomatic services to help calm the situation. 
Interestingly, Coolidge hurried to assure the Chinese that his cabinet was following just the 
policy of diplomatic settlement they had suggested.115 
As serious as it was, Japanese aggression did not represent the primary conflict in this 
period, however. Chiang Kai-shek, Sun Yat-sen’s successor and charismatic leader of the 
Nationalist party (or Guomindang), consolidated his forces into the National Revolutionary 
Army and marched first on Nanjing in 1927 and later Beijing. Along the way, he used 
Western complaints of unrest in trading ports as excuses to purge and hunt down 
communists, whom he blamed for the problems plaguing China. V.K. Wellington Koo had 
returned to China in 1922 and eventually sided with the Manchuria-based warlord Zhang 
Zuolin, opponent of unification and the Guomindang, until Zhang’s assassination by the 
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Japanese military in 1928. The Guomindang issued a warrant for Koo’s arrest, sending Koo 
into exile in France.116 Koo’s leadership in the Alliance was sorely missed. In November 
1927, the Alliance’s Chinese Student Monthly published sharply critical editorials and 
political cartoons skewering the western nations. The issue drew strong reactions from 
Chinese and Americans alike. Though a significant number of students supported the 
accusations made,117 at least one American business patron withdrew his support. The China 
Society of America, formerly quite enamored of the students’ influence, took its turn to scold 
the Alliance for its newfound radicalism. In the words of historian Stacey Bieler: “Polarizing 
politics…foreshadowed the choices the students would encounter when they returned to 
China.”118 In the early 1930s, China was torn between Nationalist Party and Communist 
Party forces. 
Though several attempts were made to reconcile the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
and Chiang’s Guomindang (GMD), each attempt eventually led back to civil war. On top of 
this, the Japanese sparked the Mukden Incident in 1931 – the bombing of a Japanese railroad 
in Mukden by Japanese military personnel but blamed on Chinese prompted the full-scale 
invasion of Manchuria. Japan set up Manchuria as a puppet state (Manchukuo). Harsh 
language flew back and forth between the Chinese and Japanese until Japan finally invaded 
China en masse in July 1937 at the outbreak of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Unofficially, 
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several American military men such as Claire Chennault and his famous Flying Tigers119 
scrambled to Chiang Kai-shek’s aid against Japan. The communists were largely left to fight 
their own battles. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the United 
States officially joined the war effort, and Japan was eventually defeated in 1945 after the 
U.S. dropped the first atomic bombs in history on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. War did not end, 
however, as the CCP and GMD resumed their own civil war first begun in 1927. 
Unfortunately for the Nationalists, years of inaction against the Japanese had hardened the 
peasant population against Chiang Kai-shek, while communist heroics were lauded across the 
north of China. With growing popular support in the countryside and guerilla warfare tactics, 
Mao Zedong, former assistant college librarian at Beijing University, swept to power at the 
head of his Red Army in 1949. 
China’s lengthy Civil War and the war with Japan vastly changed the demographics 
of China’s American-educated students. Students’ origins were mostly limited to three 
southeastern locations from the mid-19th century until the 1930s: Shanghai, Jiangsu province, 
and Guangdong province.120 English proficiency dropped meteorically; with education no 
longer a priority for the militaristic Chiang government in crisis mode, study of foreign 
languages dropped off almost entirely.121 The median age of Chinese students in the U.S. 
increased during this period as well. European consultants in 1931 suggested that the number 
of students sent abroad be reduced as well as limited to college graduates. After 1937 and the 
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beginning of open hostilities between Japan and China, the regulations tightened and 
numbers were reduced even further.122 Much of the change reflected general concern for the 
preservation of China’s intellectual class which the Guomindang firmly believed it would 
need for credibility immediately following the war. Japan’s impressive navy kept watch over 
many Chinese ports, so only air travel was considered in any way “safe.” 
Studying abroad had fallen off by the 1930s anyway, mostly due to the haphazard 
nature of the Republic’s government. Though America still officially paid its indemnity 
remission to the recently recognized (1928) GMD-run Republic of China, tense relations – 
driven in part by politically motivated students – and a lack of organization within the GMD 
limited the number of students sent to America. The regulations issued in 1931 did lend some 
organization to the business, but the Second Sino-Japanese war (1937-1945) interrupted 
indemnity fund payments from 1939 through 1943. Despite the existence of a war, such 
abandonment of educational goals didn’t sit well with people on either side of the Pacific. 
One editorial to the New York Times criticized Madame Chiang Kai-shek (Soong Mei-ling123) 
for her flippant attitude towards education in America, and hinted at Soong’s own education 
at Wellesley College in Massachusetts. It also reminded Americans of the nation’s 
responsibility towards China at a time when reports from frustrated American advisors to 
Chiang were increasingly negative.124 
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During the early years of the war, Franklin Roosevelt’s Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull declared American neutrality in the Second Sino-Japanese War. Though students lacked 
the influence they once had through the Chinese Students’ Alliance, they attracted attention 
to the war effort in smaller, more human ways. According to Chinese-American historian 
Ting Ni, “It was common to see some students standing on street corners in bleak winter or 
hot summer afternoons shaking a can for donations.”125 One news article detailed vitamins 
purchased by Chinese students at Cornell destined for a researcher at Tsinghua College with 
hopes of fighting soldier fatigue.126 These students received special attention because the 
donations were for the war effort, not themselves; yet newspapers as early as 1937 
commented on the lack of funds available to students stranded as the lines of communication 
with mainland China broke down.127 When the U.S. did declare war on Japan and the Axis 
powers of Germany and Italy after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, 
many Chinese students used what little money they had to purchase United States Defense 
Bonds.128 
However, as the war wound down, the Chinese student population in America quickly 
snowballed. Between 1944 and 1945, the number of students doubled from 270 to 543. In the 
first two years after World War II ended the number doubled again to 1194 in 1947.129 Many 
of these students remained graduate students and scientists who desperately wanted to give 
back to China their research at a time when military expansion and contracts were funding 
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enormous growth in engineering industries. Most of the major Chinese universities in 
Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing had been captured and ransacked during the Japanese 
invasion; proper educational facilities just didn’t exist in China. Unlike at the beginning of 
the 20th century, Japan was out of the question as a destination for Chinese students anxious 
to study abroad, and Europe was just as war-torn. Once again, America was the primary 
destination for ambitious, patriotic Chinese who were not just looking to escape tragedy, but 
were full of hope that they could return to “fix” China. 
The United States, meanwhile, had developed a profound sense of paranoia through 
its dealings with Joseph Stalin, the iron-fisted tyrannical leader of the communist Soviet 
Union in Russia from 1922 until his death in 1953. The prospect of a communist regime in 
China – erroneously considered a key U.S. ally during World War II – was daunting for the 
general public. Besides, with American favorites like Hu Shi serving as Chinese ambassador 
to the U.S. from 1938 to 1942 and two sisters from the American-educated Soong family130 
firmly attached to the capitalist Guomindang government, it was difficult to ignore 
Nationalist pleas for aid. During the four years following the end of World War II, the United 
States not only subsidized Chinese education in America, it also worked with the China 
Institute of America to provide engineers with paid and practical training through President 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s Depression-era creation, the Tennessee Valley Authority.131 
However, not everyone worked so assiduously with the United States to ensure a 
GMD victory. Just as the CCP and GMD existed in China, so did these parties find their way 
                                                 
130
 The three Soong sisters were the daughters of an American-educated Methodist minister named Charlie 
Soong, who made a fortune in banking and the publishing of Bibles. His daughters Soong Ai-ling, Soong 
Ching-ling, and Soong Mei-ling all married wealthy, important men tied to the Nationalist Party and 
government. Respectively, the daughters married H.H. Kung, the ROC’s finance minister, Sun Yat-sen, and 
Chiang Kai-shek. They each served as politicians in their own rights as well. Soong Ching-ling eventually 
supported the People’s Republic of China after 1949. 
 
131
 Ting, 109. 
 53 
into the politics of American-educated Chinese once again. Though most students originally 
accepted the Guomindang’s propaganda concerning communism, increasing evidence of 
communist military success on the mainland led to a matched increase in recruitment activity 
in America as well. Students viewed the GMD as increasingly incompetent and corrupt. In 
1948 and 1949, two communist organizations gained ground among American educated 
Chinese: the “Reading Group” and the Chinese Scientist Association founded in Chicago. 
The latter believed that the Guomindang’s policies stunted scientific research; the CCP 
would allow it to flourish.132  
On October 1st, 1949, Mao Zedong spoke from the wall of the Forbidden City 
overlooking Tiananmen Square his famous line, “The Chinese people have stood up!”, as he 
founded the People’s Republic of China. Chiang Kai-shek and the Guomindang fled to the 
island of Taiwan. From the peak entry rate in 1948, students sent to the United States 
immediately declined. Communists felt America could not accept their politics, and Chiang 
had to consolidate power once more – this time in Taiwan. Now the choice remained for 
students: where was China? American diplomats were asking a similar question. In the end, 
the answer seemed to lie with those Chinese most familiar with America, the American-
educated Chinese who represented much of Chiang’s family and cabinet – among them, V.K. 
Wellington Koo. 
During the Second Sino-Japanese War, Koo, undaunted after years of exile, returned 
to China with his arrest warrant forgiven, ready to serve the Guomindang government. In 
1946, China once again appointed him ambassador to the United States. In a final act of 
preservation for a community he had long represented and defended, Koo requested 
$500,000 from the U.S. for the roughly 3,900 students stranded in the country following the 
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collapse of the Nationalist government in 1949.133 Koo served as ambassador during the final 
years of the Boxer Indemnity Scholarships and saw them end in 1949. His insistence on the 
importance and necessity of the American-educated students as his very government 
crumbled at home made possible one final extension of funds for a group he and so many 
others had viewed as the hope of China. 
 
Ultimately, war and revolutionary change in China trampled the hope the students of 
the second generation embodied. Through the Chinese Students’ Alliance in the early 1900s 
and later sheer patriotism, American-educated Chinese students sought to manipulate and 
influence a relationship they imagined as comrades in arms. Amongst the populace at large, 
these students were largely successful at presenting China as a potential home for democracy. 
In contrast, the American government viewed China as a fledgling nation originally requiring 
the guiding hand of a doting father. By the 1950s, however, China had exhausted the United 
States. The students had not failed, but their victory was not entirely what they expected. 
Through personal relationships developed and perceptions created, Chinese students 
passively convinced Americans that they could not give up on the ROC on Taiwan and the 
hopeful democrats and capitalists the United States had helped train. This aspect of their 
efforts remained the American-educated Chinese student’s most lasting success. Those 
students who returned to the mainland, however, were not so lucky. 
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Chapter 3: The Lost Generation 
Taiwan and the Mainland, 1949-1979 
 
 American-educated Chinese had been one hope for China’s future during the period 
of the second generation. Though some missionaries still clung to this idealistic view of 
Chinese students in the United States, the Cold War era marked a definite turning point in the 
history of Chinese students in the United States.134 The third generation that began trickling 
in following the end of World War II in 1945 served Sino-American relations more as a 
political tool. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949 through the 
normalization of relations with the mainland on January 1st, 1979, Chinese students from the 
mainland, Taiwan, and elsewhere emerged as one more bargaining chip in the all-consuming 
Cold War. 
 
The devastating Nationalist defeat in the civil war with the Communists in 1949 left 
roughly 6000 Chinese students stranded in the United States.135 The chaos on both the 
mainland and Taiwan in addition to the founding of the communist government in Beijing 
forced the U.S. government to immediately cease both the Boxer Indemnity scholarships and 
a new Fulbright program for graduate study negotiated by Secretary of State George C. 
Marshall.136 The Chinese “imbroglio” separated huge numbers of Chinese students, mostly 
graduate students between the ages of twenty and forty, from their homes and families in 
China and cut them off from their premiere source of funding. Although the Chinese 
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Exclusion Act of 1882 was repealed in 1943 during World War II, American immigration 
laws still prevented Chinese students from gaining employment in the United States.137 Their 
situation was dire, but sheer numbers and the sympathy of the American press were on their 
side. After decades of sponsoring the education of Chinese students, neither the American 
public nor Congress was able in good conscience to leave these students stranded. 
The U.S. State Department championed the cause of the stranded students. Originally 
only able to squeeze $8,000 from a separate bill for supporting the Nationalist government in 
China in 1948, each grantee received merely $100. Unfortunately, the State Department 
launched its effort at the same time that a strong anti-spending and isolationist backlash 
swept over Washington, D.C. Still, any action was lauded by the press and the public, the 
prime example being the Foreign Aid Appropriation Act of 1950, which firmly established 
the Program of Emergency Aid to Chinese Students run jointly by the State Department and 
the Economic Cooperation Association.138 The State Department’s obligation to the students 
soon forced it into conflict with the Justice Department over the students’ rights to provide 
for themselves given their inability to return home as the Korean War139 raged on and both 
Nationalist and Communist governments were busy consolidating power. Responding to 
accusations the government was soft on communism, the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service flung warrants left and right at students who were illegally working in order to get by 
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with their schooling.140 Under heavy criticism from universities and the State Department, 
the Justice Department finally relented on April 13, 1951, allowing Chinese students the 
ability to work and stay indefinitely in the United States.141 
However, this policy was double-edged. It did not so much allow as compel students 
to remain in America. By 1950, the State Department had already banned any Chinese 
students with engineering or science degrees from returning to China.142 Deportations by 
immigration services stopped, and the United States made a conscious effort to keep all 
stranded Chinese on American soil, thereby ending any official Sino-American educational 
exchange. Such actions did not entirely contradict the general good feelings the press and 
public shared for the Chinese students. Instead, Americans believed the government was 
doing them a service by preventing them from returning to Chinese governments that would 
either heavily persecute them or co-opt their services for use against America in the Cold 
War. One editorial described them as “striking a blow for freedom.”143 Chang Pen Hsu, 43, 
and Han Ying Ku, 30, were among many students forced to reside in the United States. They 
petitioned the United States government and even the United Nations for the opportunity to 
return to their families in China.144 
Many students viewed American activities as little more than persecution, which 
didn’t help quell their urge to return to friends and family. Most of these activities consisted 
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of little more than public paranoia inspired by rabid McCarthyism145 and anti-communist 
propaganda in the United States. At the same time the American government was offering 
the carrot in the form of financial aid, it struck with the stick as well. Government officials 
claimed to be “keeping a close watch on several thousand Chinese students, teachers, and 
technical trainees.”146 These words were no idle threats; three Chinese students were 
deported in 1950 for anti-American rhetoric such as “Americans are backward and have 
nothing to be proud of.”147 Other Chinese students in the Society of Chinese Students and 
Professionals in America tried to salvage American trust by publishing a manifesto in which 
they insisted, “We are bitterly opposed to the Chinese Communist regime, and we vigorously 
protest its attempt to turn China into a battleground for the sake of the Soviet imperialists’ 
selfish desire for world conquest.”148 
The case of Professor Qian Xuesen, a famous jet propulsion expert at the California 
Institute of Technology, is of particular historical interest. Accused of communist affiliations, 
Qian decided to leave the United States with his family. Before he could leave, however, 
Immigration and Naturalization placed a detention order on him, and the professor was 
arrested as a spy in 1950. Shortly afterwards, four students attempting to return to China 
were stopped on board their boat home and forcibly brought back to the United States under 
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charges of collusion with Professor Qian.149 Ironically, the government found no evidence of 
communist connections; the experience embittered Qian so much that when finally allowed 
to leave, he returned to the People’s Republic of China where he quickly became a renowned 
researcher. Years later, he received a national medal for his contributions to the development 
of China’s first atom bomb.150 
While financial aid and well-publicized legislation to aid stranded Chinese worked on 
the majority of students, many still pined for home. In the process, they were often marked as 
harmful elements in society who upset the status quo. The United States saw an opportunity 
to foist them off on the People’s Republic of China in 1954 during talks in Geneva. The 
media pressured the government to offer Chinese students – even those with degrees in 
science and engineering – as exchange for American airmen from the Korean War and 
civilians held over from 1949. In news articles and letters to the editor at the time, Americans 
appeared desperate for an exchange. One group rationalized the exchange by suggesting that 
returned students may actually change China rather than succumb to brainwashing.151 One 
journalist boiled the argument down to intraparty politics in the U.S., insisting that the GOP 
Senate leader, William Knowland (R-California), would vote against any treaty allowing the 
return of Chinese students.152 In early 1955, United Nations chief Dag Hammarskjold entered 
negotiations with Zhou Enlai, premier of the People’s Republic of China, who reportedly did 
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not make the return of Chinese students a condition for the release of the eleven American 
airmen.153 However, as Zhou let the decision linger into April, America released seventy-six 
students with a private understanding that China would then release fifty-six Americans, 
including civilians and soldiers. The Washington Post and Times Herald commented that, if 
nothing else, “it relieves the United States of a guilty conscience and makes its moral 
position entirely clear.”154 
The situation for the intellectual class throughout mainland China and the island of 
Taiwan was grim. Americans truly believed Chinese students were better off in the United 
States, especially as stories filtered out of China about mistreatment of intellectuals even 
amongst America’s allies in Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek set a frustrating tone for the revived 
Republic of China on Taiwan in 1947 with his administration’s response to the February 28th 
(228) Incident, when guards fired on demonstrators marching in protest. The government’s 
crackdown in ensuing weeks resulted in thousands of deaths. Clearly, the Republic of China 
was a one-party regime under the Guomindang, fanatical about maintaining the status quo. 
According to Denny Roy, author of Taiwan: a Political History, “More interested in 
combating what they saw as unpatriotism than in stimulating constructive political debate, 
the [Nationalist government’s] public security organs employed their powers bluntly.”155 A 
Taiwanese professor and two students were arrested in 1964 at National Taiwan University 
for distributing seditious literature; their trial lasted only a day, and each received prison 
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terms. The professor was released after five years under pressure from an embarrassed 
United States.156 
Oppression at home discouraged Chinese students abroad from returning home even 
to Nationalist China. American-educated Chinese had been trained to participate in and help 
build democracy – this ideal seemed futile in Taiwan in the two decades after the Nationalist 
relocation in 1949. In 1966, the Los Angeles Times reported, “Only 5.47% of the 9,392 
Nationalist Chinese students who left in the past seven academic years have returned to 
Formosa…. Most went to the United States.”157 The Guomindang security apparatus 
followed students abroad however, even spying on them and punishing any anti-Nationalist 
views voiced overseas.158 Chiang’s crackdown in Taiwan caused a “brain drain” to the 
United States as approximately 2,500 students and scholars traveled to America each year – 
only five percent had plans to return. This led one American paper to predict “as the old 
Kuomintang leadership dies, the lack of political vitality here is bound to affect the future 
organizational structure of the Taiwanese government.”159 Apparently, the Taiwanese 
government agreed, because by the early 1970s, officials took steps to counter the brain 
drain, including a short-lived and controversial plan to establish special research 
professorships with double the normal pay scale. Though almost all students were self-
supported, the Nationalist government limited the number to college students attending 
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approved graduate schools and having passed English proficiency tests. Still, 77% had 
decided to remain in the United States by 1971 citing “a better academic climate.”160 
Conditions on the mainland were no better. Though original reports of heavy 
persecution of intellectuals in the People’s Republic of China were largely propaganda, 
events quickly progressed to the detriment of American-educated Chinese. Chairman Mao 
Zedong and his right-hand man, Premier Zhou Enlai, incorporated many experts in the early 
years and made speedy progress in land reform and rebuilding the countryside. Their 
triumphs seemed to peak at the close of the Korean War in 1953, however, just after having 
held off the U.S. military, the strongest military force on earth at the time. But by 1955, when 
many of the American-educated Chinese who wished to return were finally arriving back on 
the mainland, the People’s Republic of China was boiling with frustration at the United 
States.161 Most mainland students attending schools abroad were sent to the Soviet Union162 
to study engineering instead, much to America’s chagrin.163 
The final returned students from America arrived just in time for Chairman Mao 
Zedong to “let a hundred flowers bloom; let a hundred schools of thought contend.”164 As the 
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Hundred Flowers Campaign to open the government and its policies to criticism and debate 
got underway in 1956, American-educated students, along with thousands of other 
intellectuals, lent hopeful voices alongside heavy criticism that the Communist government 
could not ask them to be both “red” and “expert.”165 The backlash surprised Mao, and the 
tables suddenly turned. By the end of 1956, American-educated students found themselves 
the focus of anti-rightist sentiment. Around the same time Hu Shi was elected President of 
the China Institute in the United States where he lived,166 authors in China published an 
eight-volume collection criticizing him and his work calling him, among other things, “a 
faithful slave of American imperialism.”167 In 1957, Mao officially launched the Anti-
Rightist Campaign to purge intellectuals too critical of socialism and the Communist regime. 
During the Anti-Rightist Campaign, many American-educated students found 
themselves labeled as bourgeoisie. In the case of Fu Ying – a chemistry professor at Beijing 
University who had returned to China after hearing Mao’s founding speech in 1949 – he only 
escaped exile to the countryside through the direct interference of Mao Zedong and Zhou 
Enlai.168 Most who wished to survive in such a volatile climate were forced to adapt. A group 
of elite scholars developed who found ways to apply communism to their various fields of 
study. Many American-educated students were forced to make confessions of their past 
misdeeds amongst capitalist Americans. This elite group took these self-confessions to the 
extreme, earning the label feng pai, the wind faction. Feng pai people, as Anne Thurston, 
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Senior Research Professor of China Studies at John Hopkins University explains, “blow with 
the prevailing wind, no matter how frequently it shifts, how far from course it veers.”169 
 For most historians, the Anti-Rightist Campaign signaled the beginning of the 
downward slope in treatment of Chinese intellectuals that China would take place over the 
next two decades. Mao began a period of rapid reform in 1958 with the Great Leap Forward, 
a series of ambitious projects aimed at transforming China into a modern agricultural and 
industrial nation that ultimately led to famine and countless chunks of useless pig iron. Mao’s 
hope for grand and revolutionary triumph spat in the face of structured Communist five-year 
plans influenced by the USSR, and a rift between China and the Soviet Union began to grow. 
By 1966, the last few Chinese students in Russia returned home with Mao’s “Little Red 
Book” in hand.170 These little red books, officially titled Quotations of Chairman Mao 
Zedong, contained numerous quotations from Mao’s works and served as a symbol of the 
Cultural Revolution171 – Mao’s final attempt at grand revolutionary progress. Mao Zedong’s 
encouragement to the Chinese people to relive the Chinese Revolution leading up to CCP 
victory in 1949 predictably ended in disaster. Foreign offices shut down, gangs roamed the 
streets, and the political climate was chaos at best. By the end of the 1960s, Mao had 
                                                 
169
 Anne F. Thurston, Enemies of the People (New York: Knopf, 1987), 57. 
 
170
 Vincent J. Burke, “Last of Red China Pupils Quit Russia,” Los Angeles Times, Oct 28, 1966, 
http://www.proquest.com. 
 
171
 The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution engulfed mainland China in turmoil intermittently from 1966 to 
1976. Mao launched the new revolution on May 16, 1966 with the claim that liberal elements in the party were 
stifling socialist progress and could only be removed through genuine revolution. He depended on People’s 
Liberation Army general and Minister of Defense Lin Biao to stir up armies of youth known as Red Guards 
who fought against the four olds: old customs, old culture, old habits, and old ideas. Mao’s wife Jiang Qing rose 
to power following the suspicious death of Lin Biao in 1971; she led the “Gang of Four” which opposed 
targeted moderates like Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping and attempted to keep the revolution alive. By the end 
of the Cultural Revolution, Mao and Zhou were dead, the Gang of Four were arrested, and Deng Xiaoping was 
once more rehabilitated within the Communist party. 
 65 
relinquished some of his ideals and reestablished CCP and government power, but at the cost 
of thousands of lives and an undeclared border war with the Soviet Union. 
In 1971, world events began to shift in favor of the People’s Republic of China. U.S. 
President Richard Nixon, eager to seize a major foreign policy victory to secure his 
reelection, sent National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger to China for secret negotiations 
with Zhou Enlai. That same year, the annual vote to seat the PRC in the United Nations (UN) 
came up just as news leaked of Kissinger’s second trip to China. The United States’ UN 
delegation was flabbergasted at the news; it served to undermine the coalition UN 
Ambassador George H.W. Bush had attempted to build, and the PRC was seated in place of 
the Republic of China.172 Kissinger had gone ahead to prepare the way for a dramatic turn of 
events and apparent change in U.S. policy toward China when Richard Nixon personally 
visited China in February 1972.173 Taiwan and Chiang Kai-shek in particular were stunned 
by the sudden shift in diplomacy. Nixon left China having given serious concessions on 
Taiwan in the Shanghai Communiqué174 and the promise of imminent normalization of 
relations between the two nations – a dream he would not see fulfilled in office due to the 
Watergate scandal which plagued his second term and eventually forced his resignation in 
August 1974. 
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The establishment of less hostile relations between the U.S. and the PRC along with 
the promise of normalization spurred several resurgences in long stagnant U.S.-China 
educational exchanges from both mainland China and Taiwan. In 1974, the Republic of 
China’s Academia Sinica – its highest ranking academic body – established the Institute of 
American Studies. Eager to preserve what relationship it had left with the United States, 
Taiwan heavily emphasized educational exchange. Perhaps shocked into action, over 1,100 
students and scholars returned to Taiwan in 1973. Taiwan’s Vice President Yen Chia-kan 
said, “the United States and the Republic of China have as much in common for the future as 
for the past,” hinting at future democratic reform.175 
Meanwhile, no sooner had Nixon left China in 1972 than English language programs 
cropped up across the mainland. Language study was given priority in both elementary 
schools and universities as China prepared to jump start its educational exchange program 
with the West.176 Rumors circulated, but no official word on educational exchange was 
mentioned in China or the United States for five long years. Though only a deputy premier in 
1977, it was already clear to most people that a newly rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping177 pulled 
the strings behind Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng, Mao’s hand-picked successor to 
paramount leadership of the CCP. In 1977, Deng first announced, “To send students abroad 
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to study is also a concrete step [in modernization].”178 More hints followed. In August, 1978, 
a Chinese professor indicated that “within two years there may be as many as ten thousand 
Chinese students in foreign schools.” European nations claimed the number was too low. At 
the same time, the White House hinted at renewed educational exchange, touting “the United 
States would welcome such a program.”179 
In fact, only a month before, a delegation consisting of White House science advisor 
Frank Press and director of the U.S. liaison office and future U.S. Ambassador to China 
Leonard Woodcock met with Fang Yi, chairman of China’s Science and Technology 
Committee. The Americans had considered student exchange a bargaining chip in their trade 
talks, believing cultural exchange to be imperative for healthy relations but perhaps too soon 
for China. They were pleasantly surprised then, when not only did the Chinese agree, they 
already had the number of 500 in mind for the first exchange.180 By August 17, 1978 the 
program was ready. This time, the exchange would go both ways, with American students 
promised opportunities to study in China and over twenty-five American universities lining 
up for the influx of Chinese students.181 Stories of renewed educational exchange swarmed 
the media. Stanford reported its first Chinese student in thirty years.182 Huang Hai-ni at 
Wellesley College in Massachusetts altered her name to Roni Wang and tried to downplay 
                                                 
178
 Qian Ning, Chinese Students Encounter America, trans. T.K. Chu (Seattle, Washington: University of 
Washington Press, 2002), 10-11. 
 
179
 The Washington Post, “China is Seeking to Send Thousands in Study to West,” Aug 2, 1978, 
http://www.proquest.com. 
180
 Qian, 8-9. 
 
181
 The Washington Post, “Student-Exchange Program Readied,” Aug 17, 1978, http://www.proquest.com. 
 
182
 Linda Matthews, “Stanford to Enroll Chinese Students,” Los Angeles Times, Sep 22, 1978, 
http://www.proquest.com. 
 68 
her position as the first mainlander to study in the U.S. since 1949.183 On December 15/16, 
1978, the United States and People’s Republic of China concurrently announced they would 
establish normal diplomatic relations on January 1, 1979. Five days before, on December 26, 
1978, the first wave of government sponsored Chinese students to study in America since 
1949 boarded a plane for the United States.184 
 
For much of the thirty years after the founding of the People’s Republic of China, 
American-educated Chinese had become little more than political tools in the games of the 
People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China, and the United States. Those unlucky 
enough to be stranded in America after 1949 faced divided loyalties and sometimes 
persecution. American-educated Chinese students on the mainland or Taiwan discovered 
things were no different in either China. The Cold War extinguished the hope of many 
intellectuals, and a generation of American-educated Chinese was lost to propaganda and 
paranoia. However, by 1979, American education represented hope once more for Chinese 
students. The promise of technology for the mainland and democracy for Taiwan started a 
fever for American universities, and once more China looked to America to train its future 
leaders. 
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Chapter 4: There and Back Again 
Post-Normalization, 1979-2000s 
 
 In the late twentieth century, Chinese students rushed to the shores of North America 
for the latest research and broadest education. During the late 1980s and 1990s, China made 
the news repeatedly for what was referred to as a “brain drain” – an epidemic of students 
coming to and remaining in the United States rather than returning home. Taiwan had faced 
the same issue only a decade earlier in the 1970s, but the Tiananmen Square Massacre of 
June 1989 reinforced a rush from the mainland, culminating the 1980s decade of rapid 
influxes of Chinese students and scholars to the U.S. In recent years, however, the dynamic 
has been almost completely reversed. American-educated Chinese students, scholars and 
scientists are returning to China in droves; suddenly China, not the U.S., is the land of 
opportunity. Ethnic Chinese are not alone in this conclusion. One of China’s leading 
universities, Beijing Normal University, saw a 65% spike in international student admissions 
between 2001 and 2005.185 Almost two decades after the 1989 tragedy in Tiananmen Square, 
Chinese students are ready to face the reality of China’s rise and return home as the heroes 
China has always advertised them to be. As they go, the lobbying power built up since 1989 
fades with them, closing what may be the most influential period on American politics and 
Sino-American relations in the history of Chinese student exchange. 
 This chapter covers the restart of educational exchange and its effect on Sino-
American relations. It begins with normalization of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations and a 
focus on the genesis of the “brain drain” of Chinese students and scholars to the United 
States. Also emphasized in the first section is the importance with which both nations held 
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the exchange. The chapter reaches its midpoint with the Tiananmen Square Massacre and the 
powerful Chinese student movement in America created in its wake. This movement 
deserves special attention; it is perhaps the most effective example of Chinese students 
directly and actively influencing Sino-American relations. The chapter closes with a brief 
analysis of the brain drain and its sudden reversal since 2000. 
  
Excitement soared over the renewal of official educational exchange with mainland 
China after normalization on January 1, 1979. But it wasn’t just official government-
sponsored education that thrived under the new regulations. Cien Wu and Liu Ming, two 
twenty-five year olds from China’s “intellectual class,” attended Westchester Community 
College in New York with the private sponsorship of their Chinese-American uncle, Mr. 
Tien Y. Yang. According to Yang, “The Government just lets them go. The door is quite 
open now.”186 The door was propped open by perhaps the most influential political leader in 
China at the time, Deng Xiaoping. His family notably took the lead in study abroad when one 
of his sons, Deng Zhifang, enrolled in a graduate program at the University of Rochester in 
New York.187 Other high-level party officials also took the opportunity to send their children 
and occasionally spouses to the United States specifically for study, just another indication of 
the importance China attached to American education and its place in U.S.-China Relations. 
China demanded technical expertise, regardless of political affiliation; in a typical group of 
thirty-one students, for example, only two were members of the Chinese Communist Party. 
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By the end of 1981, 6,500 students had already entered over 160 American universities and 
colleges.188 
 Chinese students carried a veritable cornucopia of American values and lessons home 
with them where American officials hoped they would “spread their perceptions of American 
life” and effectively de-mythologize the West.189 Chinese were shocked by the materialism 
of the United States, evident in shopping malls and Hollywood films.190 Other Chinese noted 
the differences in racial bias and American attitudes from the demonized versions they were 
repeatedly exposed to by CCP propaganda for years.191 While 85% of Chinese students 
entered the fields of science and engineering, others grappled with the new and frustratingly 
different concepts in capitalism through business and economics courses. The U.S. 
Department of Commerce even sponsored a program sending American teachers to the 
Dalian Institute of Technology in China to instruct factory managers in the principles and 
applications of capitalism.192 Business courses were common for American-educated Chinese 
as well; educators at Wellesley College in Massachusetts said they “first had to reintroduce 
their students to an old concept—profit.”193 Chinese students returned to China not only 
influenced by America’s culture but by its capitalism as well. This served them well when 
China truly began to filter capitalism into Chinese society; beginning in 1985, students in 
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China no longer received automatic free tuition.194 Because these American-educated 
Chinese students had been exposed to market capitalism, they were able to serve as examples 
to the rest of the Chinese populace as reforms began. 
The renewal of educational exchange excited Americans in the 1980s, but the past 
was neither forgotten nor communism forgiven. The Cold War, while winding down, had not 
yet ended, and American intelligence agencies still feared that Chinese students in the U.S. 
might actually be a front for a complicated spy operation. For years after 1979, Federal 
Bureau of Investigation agents made the rounds to American campuses where Chinese 
students were enrolled, quietly pressing for information. An FBI agent interviewed one 
Wisconsin teacher in mid-1979, asking if she thought it was not “a little dangerous to have so 
many Chinese communists on campus?”195 Her negative response seems an accurate 
reflection of contemporary public opinion which had swung firmly in favor of China. At least 
one letter to the editor complained that such thoughts and actions “have a withering effect on 
the still fragile flowers of Sino-American friendship” and might even cause Chinese 
intelligence to “tighten the screws” on Americans abroad.196 It is notable, however, that 
unconditional support for China was by no means unanimous; the former FBI chief of the 
Chinese Unit and author of the investigative guidelines in use responded to the accusations of 
recklessness by assuring readers, “It would be arrogant to assume every Chinese student is a 
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spy. It would also be arrogant not to recognize that classified scientific and technological 
data are up for grabs by many foreign powers.”197 
The FBI was not alone in its counter-intelligence work; the Central Intelligence 
Agency also sprang into action in 1981 following an executive order from President Ronald 
Reagan which allowed domestic investigations so long as they investigated foreign citizens. 
In contrast to the FBI, the CIA actually worked through college-age classmates of Chinese 
students.198 Both agencies countered concerns with claims that not only were they protecting 
the security of Americans and the integrity of American industry, they were also preparing 
for potential defections.199 While a State Department official indicated such activities were 
typical, the fact that the agencies’ fervor was caught by the press leads to the conclusion that 
the American government was not only eager but expectant of multiple high-profile 
defections of Chinese students and scholars. 
 Requests for political asylum were not uncommon for the U.S. during the Cold War, 
but the instances connected with Chinese students display a certain adversarial nature 
underneath the façade of friendly educational exchanges. Once more students were being 
used as political tools by the U.S. government to send messages to the communist 
government in Beijing. The defections in the U.S. and spy games on both sides made 
educational exchange between the two nations especially tense. Wang Bingzhang, a Chinese 
physician claiming to be the first communist Chinese student to get his Ph.D. in North 
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America, defected in 1982 to write a human rights journal.200 Wang’s journal, China Spring, 
became the first Chinese pro-democracy magazine overseas, and his defection and 
subsequent activities caused China so much embarrassment that he was abducted and 
arrested over twenty years later in Vietnam – he is still being held in a Chinese prison.201 
China treated defections extremely seriously, as shown by the closure of an entire private 
dance exchange program when one of the dancers married an American in Texas.202 After the 
Reagan administration granted political asylum to nineteen-year-old Chinese tennis player 
Hu Na, the PRC canceled all its cultural and athletic exchanges for seven months in 1983.203 
 Originally Beijing seemed to accept a certain number of defections, understanding 
that some students had few ties to China, but as the defections became more widely reported, 
China began to lose face. Though the publicity of Hu Na’s defection and Wang’s democratic 
efforts embarrassed China, the nation’s concern was based on a growing trend. At least one 
article chalked up the supposed “brain drain” of Chinese students and scholars to large 
numbers of cultural defections.204 Another cited the repeated extensions of five-year visas 
requested by Chinese students, insisting that many doctorate programs take as many as seven 
years to complete.205 In fear of the brain drain, China began restricting travel and study 
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abroad as early as 1980 for professors and other intellectuals.206 In April 1982, the Chinese 
government passed an unpublished regulation outlawing the children of Communist party 
leaders from studying abroad apparently attempting to prevent conflicts of interest as well as 
any embarrassment should a leader’s child defect. It also hindered the development of private 
exchange programs.207 By 1988, the crackdown had continued further. Despite Chinese 
officials’ insistence that no aspects of the educational exchange had changed, a document 
acquired by students suggested otherwise. The government began telling students to come 
home earlier, and visas for outgoing students were shortened to the point where many 
students claimed it would be impossible to finish a Ph.D.208 
 Many of the concerns and heavy regulations stemmed from a fear of 
“westernization.” One anonymous Chinese student called the brain drain a “smokescreen for 
an underlying concern that students will become contaminated by American democratic 
values.”209 This sort of concern appears familiar not only to the historian, but it also struck a 
nerve with the public; one letter to the editor compared these fears to the recall of the 
Chinese Educational Mission in the early 1880s.210 Circumstances had changed greatly since 
then, but the basics remained the same. As for actual student reasoning behind the brain 
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drain, many possible answers arose. One argument pointed to the “contradictory goals” of the 
Communist Party, once more pitting “red” against “expert.”211 Students who did return often 
faced a scarcity of jobs, mediocre equipment, and constant government meddling in any 
research.212 All of this led to what China’s leaders called a “crisis of confidence” amongst 
Chinese youth.213 Their experience of central heating, American materialism, and unfiltered 
educations led many to stay rather than attempt to change policies where they felt unwanted 
at home. Of the two Open Door policies affiliated with the Middle Kingdom, one let foreign 
nations into China, the other let Chinese students out. 
 “If the Chinese have to pay a price for all this, it will come later,” stated Jay Mathews 
of the Los Angeles Times; “[t]hey may find the notions of political and social freedom 
brought back by exchange students too difficult to swallow.”214 As political protests 
increased in China especially in the second half of the 1980s, Mathews’ comment seemed 
prophetic. The protests began in 1979 alongside normalization with the advent of the 
Democracy Wall – a wall in Beijing where activists hung political posters and clamored for 
democracy. Shortly after Deng Xiaoping’s trip to the United States, the movement was put 
down.215 Despite the defections and tensions between the two nations, protests did not begin 
again in earnest until 1984 when students in Beijing took to the streets – over a lights-out 
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policy on campuses. In 1985, students attempted a protest more palatable to Chinese leaders 
– criticisms of the student treatment in the form of anti-Japanese sentiments.216 On December 
9, 1985, students canceled a major protest and instead “mixed anti-Japanese slogans with 
protests against rising prices and corruption.”217 By 1986, protests “openly embraced 
Western political ideals.”218 To students and the American press, the Chinese government 
even appeared to be listening. It allowed and even hesitantly encouraged discussions of 
freedom and democracy, even hosting a symposium in Beijing on China’s political 
structure.219 However, much like the Hundred Flowers Campaign thirty years earlier, this 
short period of discussion and reform ended in crackdowns on dissent and a reshuffling of 
political leadership. 
 In January, 1987, the Chinese Politburo booted party secretary Hu Yaobang as 
Deng’s second-in-command due to his willingness to support political liberalization.220 His 
ouster immediately made Hu a rallying symbol for students both in China and the United 
States. Hu Yaobang’s dismissal snapped Chinese students in America into action. 
Representatives of Chinese students and scholars in the United States drafted a statement 
declaring the party’s decision “a fundamental blow against the modernization program and a 
sharp blow against the Chinese intelligentsia,” who viewed Hu as an important advocate.221 
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By January 20, 1987, 1,000 students had endorsed the open letter to the Communist party – 
remarkably, many confirmed they used their real names.222 Said one student when reminded 
of his country’s Cultural Revolution, “But we are being critical of our Government in a 
constructive way. What the Government is doing now isn’t rational.”223 Indeed, their 
activism didn’t end with one open letter. After Yang Wei, an American-educated Chinese 
student was arrested at his parents’ home in China, Chinese students in the U.S. followed the 
case and sent a petition addressed to former Chinese premier and the new party secretary 
(replacing Hu Yaobang), Zhao Ziyang, noting the government’s breach of law in holding 
Yang without trial, as well as requesting permission to speak without fear of retribution when 
Yang’s trial was eventually held.224 It is apparent from these activities that by 1987 Chinese 
students abroad were engaged as they had not been since the 1920s. 
 Chinese students were mostly quiet during 1988, but the unexpected death of Hu 
Yaobang on April 15, 1989 shook them from their temporary slumber. Students marched to 
Tiananmen Square to pay their respects, but – as in 1976 at the death of Zhou Enlai – 
mourning soon gave way to protest. Demonstrations continued in Tiananmen and quickly 
spread to other cities in the weeks that followed.225 Students had originally planned to protest 
on May 4, 1989 to commemorate the seventieth anniversary of the May 4th Movement of 
1919, but Hu’s death gave the protest depth and momentum, signaling a direct refutation of 
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government policies given Hu’s ouster two years earlier.226 However, Chinese leaders were 
unwilling to allow the protests to continue and potentially embarrass them in the face of 
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s upcoming state visit in mid-May. By April 28, 
government leaders had promised an open discussion with the demonstrators, and the 
students declared a premature victory, stating “the democratic era in China starts from 
today,”227 as the crowds in Tiananmen increased in size and diversity. Only two days later, 
student leaders denounced the negotiations as “a ruse” and insisted the government was only 
“buying time.”228 The twin embarrassments of protests during Gorbachev’s May 15 visit and 
the U.S. Navy visit on May 19 led China to declare martial law on May 20. 229 U.S. 
Ambassador James Lilley remained in China rather than return to the States for a meeting, 
leaning on his belief that China was “coming unstuck.”230 
Protest efforts continued to swell amongst Chinese students in America as well. On 
January 9, Yang Wei was released after almost two years to the day of incarceration. The 
Chinese students in the United States were emboldened by this success; their lobbying efforts 
had influenced the American Congress to pass a joint resolution demanding Yang’s release 
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and pressured China to release him.231 Just as crowds gathered in Tiananmen Square in 
Beijing, Chinese students and residents in America gathered in the small town of Bolinas, 
California to discuss the movement at home and the memory of the May 4th Movement in 
1919. Participants questioned China’s identity and noted the May 4th call for “democracy and 
science” – two values prominent in the 1989 movement as well.232 On May 20, the 
Association of Chinese Students and Scholars organized a protest outside the Chinese 
embassy in the District of Columbia. 233 Chicago and Washington, D.C. each saw 3,000 
demonstrators, largely students, marching and chanting outside the Chinese consulate and 
embassy respectively; another 1,000 gathered outside the Chinese consulate in San Francisco 
with still more in Manhattan.234 Support for the protestors among the American-educated 
Chinese community appeared overwhelming. That support mixed with grim dread as troops 
stirred within Beijing. However, Chinese students in the U.S. remained steadfast in their 
support even as troops closed in on their counterparts in Beijing, as one example shows. 
When an urgent call for garbage bags for the protestors came up on the rudimentary internet 
of the times,235 Chinese students on two separate campuses within the University of 
California system along with Stanford University banded together to purchase 1,800 bags at a 
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local discount store, then sent them along with pairs of walkie-talkies via a “trusted courier” 
on May 25.236 
 Just over a week later, the massacre began. On the night of June 3 in Beijing, the 
People’s Liberation Army commenced their assault on Beijing from all directions, shooting 
civilians on their route to the Square. As many as 2,700 demonstrators were killed in the 
attacks which carried over into June 4. Before Tiananmen, Americans had viewed China as 
“steadily reforming” due to the “carefully nurtured” relationship – largely through the 
American education of Chinese students. During the massacre, however, American television 
stations broadcast images of the massacre back to the United States, and Americans were 
forced to realize the tyrannical nature of their “friends” in Asia. Reporters covered the 
crackdown in Beijing extensively, and reports produced some of the most enduring pictures 
of hardship, chaos, and repression in the history of China.237 Americans had been led – by 
leaders in China and the White House in the U.S. – to believe that the PRC was changing; the 
crackdown was like a slap in the face. 
 If the scenes from Tiananmen Square shocked Americans, they horrified Chinese 
studying in the United States. Many students anxiously awaited news about loved ones at 
home; others were busy using fax machines to send American newspaper articles on the 
tragedy home to clueless relatives as censorship swept across China.238 Students compared 
their leaders to Hitler and called Prime Minister Li Peng a murderer.239 The day after the 
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massacre, Chinese students in the U.S. wrote a letter to American President George H.W. 
Bush decrying China as “an evil fascist dictatorship.” Pei Mei Xin, a graduate student at 
Harvard, called the attack an atrocity and said, “Never before in Chinese history has the army 
killed peaceful students.”240 The statement is dubious, but the level of outrage and disgust is 
clear. But the Chinese students were not just furious, they were also well-organized. 
 Largely because of the steady support for the movement in Beijing prior to the 
crackdown, American-educated students already had a detailed organization set in place. 
With roughly 40,000 Chinese students in America and countless more Chinese-Americans, 
the students quickly realized such numbers could become a powerful force in American 
politics.241 Before the events of June 4 transpired, Chinese students were already writing 
Congress with detailed suggestions on how to help democratize China by helping students 
already in the United States prolong their stays.242 Immediately following the news of the 
crackdown, students marched outside the Capitol – where they were met by senators of both 
parties – and outside the White House – where they were joined by civil rights activist Jesse 
Jackson. Many students had technical expertise, and they maintained an online forum called 
CHINANET to plan an agenda. The agenda soon came to include economic sanctions on 
China, boycotting the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing, and legislation to protect Chinese 
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students in America.243 Furthermore, on July 30, 1989, students founded The Independent 
Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars at the First Chinese Students Congress.244 
 The new lobbyists rode a wave of public and congressional sentiment over the next 
several years. In an extreme example, some New Yorkers called a special criminal report line 
in Beijing set up to catch the student leaders from Tiananmen; when asked to report a 
criminal, they responded, “Deng Xiaoping.”245 When President Bush released his original 
executive order offering students the opportunity to extend their stay by a year, only three 
students accepted it due to a catch forcing them to return immediately after the year was up. 
Wu’er Kaixi and Yan Jiaqi, two student leaders in theTiananmen Square protests, originally 
acted as the public faces of the movement, but Zhao Haiqing, a biochemistry graduate 
student from Harvard, eclipsed them as spokesman, organizer, and lobbyist. Zhao cleverly 
ignored a bill proposing permanent residence he realized was too extreme and instead threw 
his support and that of his fellow students behind a more moderate bill to temporarily 
suspend the requirement to return home – a bill proposed by a relatively fresh political face 
from San Francisco, California, Representative Nancy Pelosi (D). The students also enlisted 
the support of another rising star in the Democratic Party, George Stephanopoulos – then an 
aide to House Majority Leader Richard Gephardt (D) and future consultant to President 
William Clinton. 
 The students accomplished a great deal with the power they wielded after Tiananmen. 
Pelosi’s bill easily passed both houses. When President Bush vetoed the bill to show Chinese 
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leaders he would not abandon their nation, he immediately issued an executive order granting 
the same privileges as the bill. The students pushed for Congress to override the president’s 
veto anyway to show how little the nation supported Bush’s policies; the override passed in 
the House but failed by only four votes in the Senate. Representative Pelosi had taken notice 
of the publicity her bill garnered and immediately shifted focus with the students to economic 
sanctions on China and the implementation of human rights checks on Most-Favored-Nation 
(MFN) trading status. The administration managed to tie in the American radio station Voice 
of America, and Senator Joe Biden (D-Delaware) insisted that China curb arms proliferation. 
With Pelosi’s assurance, the students accepted these compromises, and subsequently MFN 
was nominally tied to human rights.246 Though the White House never canceled MFN, the 
bill’s success marked a high point in the influence of Chinese students on American politics 
and US policy toward China. 
 Attention remained on China throughout the 1992 presidential campaign. Democratic 
presidential candidate and Governor of Arkansas Bill Clinton “courted” Zhao Haiqing’s 
opinions on China policy. Clinton targeted Bush’s “coddling” of the “butchers of Beijing” as 
despicable.247 Nancy Pelosi took the opportunity of the presidential campaign to push 
through a bill granting Chinese students already in America between June 5, 1989 and April 
11, 1990 permanent residency in the United States. Pelosi’s bill was called the Chinese 
Student Protection Act of 1992. By the one-year deadline, over 57,000 Chinese students had 
applied for residency. The lobbyist movement had been a resounding success, but China once 
again faced the pressure of a brain drain. China protested the act, citing a near-perfect record 
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on human rights with regard to American-educated Chinese since 1992, facts the State 
Department corroborated.248 
 By the mid-1990s, however, students’ reasons for remaining in the United States no 
longer revolved around Tiananmen. Rather, much like the years prior to the crackdown, 
students simply saw no future in China. China’s housing shortages, for instance, struck 
potential returnees as too great a factor. Lack of communication with the West and a steep 
learning curve also affected students’ decisions. One student claimed that when he went 
abroad a second time after a prolonged stay in China, “he could hardly talk to his former 
teachers and classmates because he had never heard of the topics of their research.”249 Filial 
piety even played into the brain drain. Many parents remembered the backlash against 
intellectuals in the 1950s and begged their children to stay in the United States where they 
could find steady jobs, appreciation, and even occasional extra funds to send back to 
China.250 As many of the American-educated Chinese students became successful scientists 
and businessmen, the brain drain appeared to be costing China not only talent, but money and 
prestige as well. 
 While the People’s Republic of China was struggling to fix their brain drain, the 
Republic of China on Taiwan had already begun fixing their own. According to David 
Zweig, author and director of the Center on China’s Transnational Relations, “The 
Nationalist government…offered subsidies for travel, help in job placement and assistance in 
business investment.”251 Perhaps most importantly, Taiwan had become a full-fledged 
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democracy. By the late 1980s, Taiwan had legalized political parties other than the 
Guomindang, and in 1996, Taiwan began operating as a democracy with the direct popular 
elections of representatives to the National Assembly as well as the President and Vice 
President.252 Taiwan even worked the angle of American education into its relations with the 
United States when Taiwanese lobbyists influenced Congressional legislation to secure 
President Lee Teng-hui253 a visa to visit his alma mater at Cornell in June 1995 over the 
objections of the White House.254 This move infuriated the People’s Republic of China, 
which had been assured by the State Department that no such visit would be allowed. 
However, the visit also inadvertently helped stir patriotic fervor amongst Chinese students in 
the United States. During Lee’s visit, approximately 200 pro-China protestors demonstrated 
on Cornell’s campus.255 
The NATO256/U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999 and the 
U.S. spy plane’s collision with a Chinese aircraft over Chinese airspace in 2001 also raised 
the patriotic ire of Chinese students in the United States. Students began to develop a 
stronger nationalistic attachment to China; this was helped of course, by China’s rapid 
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economic advancement. In the early 2000s, China began copying Taiwan’s actions to entice 
international students to return. In a complete reversal of historical trends, no-interest 
business loans and tax cuts coaxed Chinese graduated students and immigrants in the United 
States away from their homes and families.257 The booming economy and attractive risks 
have also drawn Chinese students and professionals – known in China as hai gui, or “sea 
turtles”258 – back to China.  
The pay is still relatively low, but academic freedom is wider than ever before in 
China; one professor at Tsinghua University says, “I’ve designed my own courses [here] with 
no constraints” including one on democratic theory.259 Research, Chinese scientists and 
graduate students claim, is actually less constricted in China than in the United States. After 
American President George W. Bush’s executive order banning the use of stem cells in 
research in August 2001, scientists poured into China where such research was and still is 
actually encouraged. The Washington Post reported in February, 2008 that “as…U.S. 
research institutes complain about the tightening…in the nation’s scientific budget, China has 
announced that it will double its research-and-development spending by 2010, to about $69 
billion.”260 The recent recession in the United States opened the financial markets to this 
“reverse brain drain” as well, and China pounced. After heavy losses in the financial sector in 
New York, Chinese financial institutions held recruiting sessions in New York and Chicago 
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to “diversify and upgrade their own staffs.”261 In fact, whereas a quarter of all Chinese 
students before 2004 remained in the United States, in the current environment only ten 
percent plan to stay. Only seven percent “believe that the best days of the U.S. economy lie 
ahead.”262 
 
 China’s extreme involvement in the U.S. economy as the holder of the largest portion 
of American debt totaling nearly two trillion dollars, and the reverse brain drain of Chinese 
along with a trickle of American students could signal a major shift in Sino-American 
Relations. In 1979, China had everything to gain from normalization. America was quite 
literally the land of opportunity for Chinese students – most refused ever to return to their 
homelands. As they had for roughly a hundred years, Americans believed they held China’s 
future in their hands in the form of impressionable Chinese youth. Chinese students also 
stepped up during the fourth generation of students after the tragedy at Tiananmen Square, 
forming the most influential organization of Chinese students in America’s history with 
direct effects on the United States’ China policy and its government; Nancy Pelosi ascended 
to the position of Speaker of the House in 2006. The importance of education and the control 
of youth have been made abundantly clear through student movements and economic 
pressure. In the wake of Beijing’s successful hosting of the Olympics in the summer of 2008 
and America’s recession-plagued economy, U.S.-China educational exchange is quickly 
shifting in China’s favor. If the story of Chinese students is any clue, shifts in diplomacy are 
soon to follow. 
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Conclusion 
 
 The history of China’s American-educated students forms a crucial component of the 
history of U.S.-China relations. Until recently, it has rested on the foundation of American 
superiority – the belief that America could help improve China through spreading not only 
technology but democratic American values as well. During the nineteenth century, those 
values also included Christianization, and educational exchange was often championed in 
America by missionaries and in China by Christian converts. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, Americans took pride in students like Hu Shi and V.K. Wellington Koo, 
who contributed to the genesis of a new, ostensibly more republican China. During the Cold 
War, Americans relished their role as protectors of the stranded third generation of Chinese 
students, and in 1979 the United States once more welcomed Chinese students to American 
shores with the promise of democracy and science. 
 As this thesis strives to illustrate, it is necessary to look at the whole picture of 
China’s students’ forays in American education to understand the full impact they have had 
on relations between the two nations. Since the early 1900s, trends are visible of Chinese 
student organizations petitioning the U.S. government with increasing success. Chinese 
students also presented Americans with an image of driven intellectuals during the second 
generation and diehard democrats during the fourth generation – uniquely altering popular 
perceptions of China as a whole. This was especially true for students opposed to 
communism both in the decade after the founding of the PRC in 1949 and again in 1989 and 
the years immediately following; Americans took student dislike for the communist regime 
to represent general popular dissent. The complete history of American-educated Chinese 
students also bears witness to China’s perpetual fear of westernization. Only in recent years 
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has this fear subsided, but China has exchanged ideological loyalty for fierce patriotism, and 
it has done so successfully. 
 Due to the broad nature of the research, several conclusions suggest new questions 
and fields of research yet to review. As Chinese students return to China in droves either to 
escape economic crisis or dive into heady risks, the question remains as to the real amount of 
democratic values American universities have managed to instill in these “sea turtles.” 
American politicians have insisted since 1979 that trade and economic modernization 
naturally lead to democratization, but such efforts rely on a trained elite. Has America 
produced such an elite group for China? This historical narrative also opens itself up 
naturally to comparisons with other educational exchanges involving Europe or perhaps most 
noticeably India. This other Asian giant has also seen a stunning reverse brain drain in recent 
years.263 
 Regardless of the influx of returned students to China, the U.S.-China educational 
exchange system is stronger now than ever before as China’s universities become more open. 
Chapter 4 ended on a bleak note for Americans, emphasizing the results of the deepening 
recession and the loss of many Chinese experts trained in the United States. However, 
China’s universities have opened up more than ever, and despite repression of minorities, 
China’s censorship laws are rapidly falling away under worldwide scrutiny. China is now 
ranked as a popular destination country for international students, behind only Germany, 
France, the UK, and the United States.264 With the history of American-educated Chinese 
students as a blueprint, promising developments in China may not lie beyond expectations. 
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Bibliographical Essay 
 
 The history of American-educated Chinese students spans more than 150 years of U.S.-
China relations history, encompassing an epic period of diplomatic relations beginning with the 
missionary movement of the 1830s and continuing to the present. The evolution of the study of 
U.S.-China educational exchange was first discussed in the introduction. This bibliographical 
essay seeks to provide sources for further research and context for the educational exchange as 
well as explain the choices in source material made for this specific study. 
 Today Chinese student organizations are commonplace in U.S. colleges and universities, 
their development and impact on the politics in China and America, as well as the diplomacy 
between the two nations, peaked in the early 1990s and their power has since waned. The brain 
drain of Chinese students and intellectuals is reversing, pulling the same students and 
intellectuals – as well as Americans – towards China for studies, employment, and research. 
Given the influence Chinese students and returned scholars have had on the relations between the 
United States and China in the past, the study of the trends alongside the history of U.S.-China 
relations in this thesis is especially timely as increasing numbers of Chinese students forsake 
America for home in China. 
 For this study, I drew on both primary and secondary sources. Without a firm command 
of traditional Chinese characters, personal accounts from Chinese students were both difficult to 
obtain and highly impractical to use. Also out of reach were collegiate archives at the University 
of California, Yale University, and the University of Michigan – institutions attended by several 
important groups of Chinese students. However, primary sources were still available in the form 
of a few personal accounts. Some quotations from the Chinese Students’ Monthly (published 
1906-1931) are available through Stacey Bieler’s “Patriots” or “Traitors”?: A History of 
American Educated Chinese Students (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). Yung Wing’s 
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autobiography, My Life in China and America (1909; North Stratford, New Hampshire: Ayer Co. 
Publishers, Inc, 2000) is the best personal account in English of this student pioneer’s life and 
struggles during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Yung Wing’s account covers his early 
years in Hong Kong fairly well, but the period in which he studied in America is glossed over, 
giving much more attention to contacts he made in the U.S. Where his autobiography shines is in 
its treatment of the genesis of the Chinese Educational Mission. In any study of the first 
generation of Chinese scholars, this book is irreplaceable. 
 A focus on the impact of Chinese students on American politics and diplomacy in regards 
to China also lent itself to another primary source: American newspapers. For searches through 
the historical archives, I used the online database Proquest and its four available newspapers: The 
Wall Street Journal (1889-1991), Los Angeles Times (1881-1996), Washington Post (1877-
1992), and The New York Times (1851-2005). A focus on four major national newspapers, each 
with their own regional specialties, offers a glimpse at media attention historically as well as a 
reflection of public opinion and perception. At least one of the archives (The New York Times) 
reaches all the way back to the 1851; Yung Wing graduated from Yale University in 1854. The 
rest all start before the turn of the century. I drew on basic articles, analyses, and editorials for the 
completion of this narrative. The continuous use of newspaper articles also lends continuity to the 
narrative, following not only the history of Chinese students in America but the history of 
American views and biases involving these students. Almost ninety separate articles concerning 
educational exchange or the lives of Chinese students are included in the bibliography of this 
paper. Given that some, especially in the early 1900s, are no more than blurbs, it would prove 
unwieldy to review each individual article. During the most remarkable periods of educational 
exchange – the recall of the C.E.M., the stranded Chinese students after 1949, and the aftermath 
of the Tiananmen Square Massacre – several more articles were available; however, those listed 
were the most complete and helpful in learning student reaction and public opinion. 
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 Also of use are certain websites. Amnesty International’s website on human rights 
violations in Asia (http://asiapacific.amnesty.org) tracks many of the cases the Chinese student 
organizations in the United States still follow. Such cases can also be found at the website of the 
Independent Federation of Chinese Students and Scholars (IFCSS: http://www.ifcss.org/home/) 
in that organization’s press releases. The website itself is now defunct; it has not been updated 
since March 17, 2008. However, information on the organization’s manifesto and past activities 
remains available. 
 There are many articles being written currently on the “reverse brain drain” from the 
United States (and other nations) to China. However, the four most helpful in preparing this 
study were a piece in the San Francisco Chronicle which explained the term “sea turtles” (Jun 
Wang, “The Return of the ‘Sea Turtles’: Reverse Brain Drain to China,” Oct 1, 2005), a 
Washington Post article by journalist Ariana Eunjung Cha (“Opportunities in China Lure 
Scientists Home,” February 20, 2008), an article in the weekly magazine Newsweek (Mary 
Hennock, “The Big Brains Are Back,” Aug 9, 2008), and an online news blog called New 
American Media (Vivek Wadhwa “Is the U.S. Experiencing its First Brain Drain?” Mar 31, 
2009). While Wadhwa’s article offers a statistical breakdown of the reverse brain drain, the 
others listed offer further examination of the impact of returned scholars in China and the 
meaning of their loss to the United States. 
 The secondary literature on the subject still has several holes. Most coverage of U.S.-
China educational exchange today is undertaken by major newspapers and independent 
institutions including the New York Times and the Institute of International Education, that fall 
outside of mainstream academia. Scholarly works are often highly specialized, limiting research 
to either contemporary politics or specific periods of history in the field. Chinese authors tend to 
focus more on societal and anthropological aspects of educational exchange, while American 
authors are inclined to study its history and politics. Nearly all of this literature, however, 
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addresses Chinese students as a group to be acted upon, rather than actors with influence and 
agendas. 
 Any study first requires a firm grounding in China’s history. Renowned China historian 
Jonathan Spence’s The Search for Modern China (W.W. Norton, 2000) is the accepted traditional 
textbook for China’s modern history – typically accepted as the period beginning with the fall of 
the Ming Dynasty in 1644. Historian Keith Schoppa’s work in Revolution and Its Past: Identities 
and Change in Modern Chinese History (Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Prentice 
Hall, 2006) is less expansive, but it does offer a closer look at some of the people involved, 
setting its tone with a first chapter full of biographical sketches spanning the period of modern 
history. The only book necessary for a thorough study of Taiwanese history is political scientist 
Denny Roy’s Taiwan: A Political History (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). The 
book is an excellent source of historical context for Taiwan’s actions during the Cold War and 
beyond, and it also provides a stellar background of Taiwan’s history beyond the Ming era. 
 Less general literature on China’s modern history is also available. Current literature on 
pioneering British missionary Robert Morrison is light at best, and typically subsumed into other 
works on the general effects of missionaries in China. For this study, the best information on 
Morrison was found in W.J. Townsend’s 1888 biography of the missionary, Robert Morrison: 
The Pioneer of Chinese Missions (London: S.W. Partridge & Co.). Anne Thurston’s work on the 
Cultural Revolution, like Schoppa’s textbook, contrasts Jonathan Spence’s writing by foregoing 
an epic historical narrative to focus instead on the consequences of Mao’s plot on China’s 
intellectual class, the Enemies of the People (N.Y.: Knopf, 1987) from which the book gets its 
title. 
 Readers looking for sources on U.S.-China relations have a wealth of literature to turn to. 
China’s views on America since 1848 are provided through a series of short journal entries, 
letters, and other works ably translated and edited by David Arkush and Leo O. Lee in Land 
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Without Ghosts (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1989). Though its coverage 
ends before the bombshells in 1989, its historical value is without question, providing a glimpse 
at the views of both very important Chinese diplomats like Hu Shi and Chen Lanbin as well as 
the average Chinese traveler. 
 Andrew Gyory and Kitty Calavita both focus more on the American side of the Pacific in 
their works on the Chinese Exclusion Act. Gyory’s book Closing the Gate: Race, Politics, and 
the Chinese Exclusion Act (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) is most 
notable for its conflicted study of the rationale behind the Act. The latter half of the book also 
gives context for Chinese people remaining in America. Calavita’s journal article “The Paradoxes 
of Race, Class, Identity, and "Passing": Enforcing the Chinese Exclusion Acts, 1882-1910” 
(2000) in Law & Social Enquiry also provides historical and legal context for the passage of the 
Act, with an adept explanation of the methodical approach the American Congress took to treaty 
revision. 
James Mann, a former columnist for the Los Angeles Times, provides a thorough 
treatment of U.S.-China relations from President Richard Nixon’s diplomatic efforts in the early 
1970s through the Clinton administration. The latest edition of About Face: A History of 
America’s Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton (2000; N.Y.: Vintage Books, 
1998) also includes a new afterword reflecting on the final years of the Clinton administration 
and the rhetoric of the 2000 presidential campaign. The book contains excellent prose and 
detailed information on the post-1989 Chinese student movement in the United States. For 
further information on Nixon’s visit and its effects on U.S.-China relations, Margaret 
MacMillan’s 2007 book, Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed The World, is well-written 
and dives into the psychology of the four men (Mao, Zhou, Kissinger, and Nixon) central to the 
Shanghai Communiqué produced in 1972. 
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 Research focused on U.S.-China educational exchange in academia has been largely split 
into three categories: statistical analyses and reports, cultural or sociological studies of Chinese 
students, or historical studies of specific generations or periods. The first typically provides little 
context but offers occasionally startling figures. Tsinghua University’s A Survey of Chinese 
Students in American Universities and Colleges in the Past One Hundred Years (1954) was 
ordered due to the hundredth anniversary of Yung Wing’s graduation from Yale University, and 
consists mostly of numbers of students in the United States as well as their chosen universities 
and fields. David Zweig offers slightly more context, including brief snippets from interviews, in 
his analysis of the brain drain from China in the 1990s in China’s Brain Drain to the United 
States: Students and Scholars in the 1990s (Berkeley, California: Institute of East Asian Studies, 
1995). The latest statistical report issued by the IIE entitled U.S.-China Educational Exchange: 
Perspectives on a Growing Partnership (N.Y.: AIFS Foundation and Institute of International 
Education, 2008) contains up-to-date statistics and several journal articles written by professors 
and researches with interests in U.S.-China educational exchange. 
 Cultural studies of Chinese students “encountering” America seem primarily the domain 
of Chinese authors, and entirely in the last decade. Ye Weili, Ting Ni, Qian Ning, Li Hongshan 
(among which only Qian operates in China primarily) focus their research on sociological 
examples that parallel the history of Chinese students abroad, typically in specific periods once 
again. Ye Weili provides thematic discussion of Chinese student life in America during the late 
1800s through the 1920s in Seeking Modernity in China’s Name (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2001). Ting Ni’s The Cultural Experiences of Chinese Students Who Studied in the United 
States During the 1930s-1940s (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2002) was most useful in 
this narrative for its historical data on the educational exchange movement during the Second 
Sino-Japanese War and World War II. Qian Ning’s work in Chinese Students Encounter America 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002) provides information on the re-opening of 
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educational exchange after normalization in 1979 and through the 1990s. However, given that the 
book is written by a communist who still resides in China – the book was translated to English 
from the Chinese – very little mention is made of Tiananmen Square in 1989. Li Hongshan’s 
treatment of students during the second generation deals more with politics and sociology than a 
straight historical study, but Li’s U.S.-China Educational Exchange: State, Society, and 
Intercultural Relations, 1905-1950 (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 
2008) is the most recent historical study of educational exchange. 
 American interest in the subject of U.S. educational exchange ignited during World War 
II, when Americans viewed China as a crucial ally against the Japanese. Consequently, one of the 
most celebrated works written during this period, Thomas LaFargue’s China’s First Hundred 
(Pullman, Washington: Washington State University Press, 1942), deals more with the perceived 
western-influenced advancement of China’s infrastructure and military after the Chinese 
Educational Mission than the experiences and diplomatic efforts of its scholars abroad. 
Corresponding to the collapse of relations between the mainland and the United States, there is 
almost a complete void of literature discussing this topic between 1949 and 1979. Finally, in the 
late 1980s, a few articles and Leo A. Orleans’ Chinese Students in America: Policies, Issues, and 
Numbers (National Academies Press, 1988) were published; these texts dealt more with 
government and sociology than with an understanding of the historical context of educational 
exchanges and so were of little use to the general narrative. A 1987 reprinting of LaFargue’s 
book once again offered a view of the Chinese crawling back to the West after a prolonged 
period in the dark. 
 Historian Stacey Bieler laid considerable groundwork for Li Hongshan’s most recent 
work with her book, “Patriots” Or "traitors"?: A History of American Educated Chinese 
Students (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). She covers the entirety of the first generation in 
her prologue. Her epilogue then wanders between a discussion of the evolution of the ‘Chinese 
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M.I.T.’, Tsinghua University, and the various issues faced by modern Chinese students. Bieler 
devotes the majority of the book to the period from the turn of the century to 1949, but this 
investigation of the second generation is by far the most thorough and useful of any of the several 
listed. 
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